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ABSTRACT 
The Castillo de San Fernando de Omoas 
The History of a Fiasco 
by 
Jamee L. Zackrison 
The concept behind the fort of San Fernando de Omoa grew 
from the unrest caused by pirates along the coasts of 
Central America in the 17th and 18th centuries. The poor 
condition of the Caribbean defenses resulted partly because 
Spain did not know how to deal with the pirates. The 
latter did not have very much strength, and changed tactics 
as often as the Spaniards did. Several military 
strategists, including the Count of Aranda, Juan Bautista 
Antonelli, and apparently, Luis D!ez Navarro, recommended 
forts--in the case of this study, San Fernando de Omoa--to 
serve as bases and safe ports from which fleets might seek 
out and fight aggressively against the pirates, and later 
the British Navy. But the Spanish Crown, with its 
paternalistic and parsimonious theories, did not follow a 
consistent plan during the construction of the system, and 
ended by arming and manning Omoa defensivelys no fleet 
ever complemented the defense of the fort. For that reason 
Omoa fell at the first attempt by an enemy to take it. 
This study explains the background to this specific 
case of Omoa, then provides a chronological overview of the 
construction period. Besides an analysis of strategic 
value, it mentions the commercial activity during the 
construction period, and analyses any influence this 
activity could have had on the planning and construction 
and eventual use of the fort. A chapter is devoted to the 
use of Indian and black slave labor during the construction 
period. 
Materials found especially useful during the research 
include the Annual Register, in the Loma Linda University, 
La Sierra Campus library; the unpublished "Historia" of 
Rubio Sanchez at the Academia de Geografia e Historia de 
Guatemala which the author so graciously made available 
from his personal library; Manuel Zapatero's Organization 
of American States-funded technical assessment of the fort, 
found in the Instituto de Geografia e Historia in Honduras 
(IHAH); the long and enjoyable chats with Victor Cruz 
Reyes, research director at IHAH; Mario Argueta's article 
on the Indian labor at the fort, in the Universidad 
Nacional Aut6noma de Honduras library; and finally, a visit 
to photograph the fort itself. 
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Chapter One: The Colonial Background 
The reign of Carlos I witnessed an awkward situation 
in Spain: increasing expansion into an unprecedented type 
of colonialism left Spain weak yet eager. With its economy 
bolstered by the increasing influx of gold and silver from 
the colonies, Spain had overextended both in manpower and 
expenditures far beyond its capacity to keep up. Though 
increased in power and prestige in Europe, her enemies--
England, France, and Holland--struck at the American 
colonies in an attempt to weaken Spain's position in 
Europe. And strike they did with a vengeance: by the mid-
1500's pirates had attacked and looted Puerto Rico, 
Cartagena de Indias, Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and the 
Spanish Main at least once each. The biggest difficulty 
came from incursions in the Caribbean: privateers and 
buccaneers dominated the Gulf of Mexico for approximately 
twenty years, from 1665 to 1685, during which time no 
seaport had any safety from their pillaging. 1 
Defending the Panamanian isthmus posed a particularly 
grave problem. The existing defensive system included 
forts at Portobelo, Santiago, San Felipe, and San Geronimo 
in the north; Chagres had a small garrison. On the south 
coast, only Panama City had any fortification, unless a 
small rampart at Chep6 could be counted. Only 790 men 
2 
defended the strip of land over which the wealth of the 
Incas passed on its way to Spain.2 
English privateers and buccaneers, whether under royal 
license or not, began raiding the Spanish Caribbean during 
Mary Tudor's reign, but their tripe increased when 
Elizabeth took over, as she did not restrict them. During 
the early years, most pirate bands worked alone, using one 
vessel to fight from, though they usually took along an 
oared pinnace, in case they were becalmed.3 But after 
1552, pirates began joining together in small squadrons. 
At first they had worked as legitimate traders, but after 
hearing how Spain treated John Hawkins, many decided that 
piracy would be the only profitable trade in the Caribbean. 
Spain, following its policy of total dominion, defined as a 
pirate anyone sailing in the Caribbean without a license, 
and treated them as such. Carlos II, on November 14, 1690, 
issued a Royal Decree ordering all captured pirate officers 
(corporal through captain) summarily hung. Enlisted 
pirates of no rank would be sentenced to life in the 
galleys.ll 
Roland Hussey points out that Spain could not stop 
these pirates, but because the pillage of small American 
towns did not at any time hurt the economy of the Iberian 
Peninsula, not much had been done about the problem.5 In 
later years the situation became so bad that Governor 
Francisco de Parga of Honduras could not safely approach 
3 
the north shores of his province--even with the company of 
150 soldiers.6 
To all appearances, Elizabeth I could not stop 
the English pirates either, though she actually may have 
encouraged--and sponsored--some of them. But Felipe II 
allowed himself to be fooled by appearances, and decided 
that diplomatic pressure--not aggressive warfare--provided 
the best policy. That may be why he insisted private 
investors finance any military buildup in the Caribbean. 
He did send the Conde de Feria to the English government to 
protest--unsuccessfully--Henry Stranke's and William 
Willfort's atrocities. F e r nan d e z A 1 var e z s t at e s t ha t 
shortly after this protest, Elizabeth armed over 300 ships 
to combat future crime of this sort--though the Spanish 
believed they sailed for more piracy.7 Then in 1561 a 
British squadron did equip to counter buccaneering, and 
Elizabeth ordered all merchant ships to disarm. Felipe 
II's policy of diplomacy seemed to be working. 
The pirates did not alone profit from Spain's chaotic 
defense policies. The British government entered the scene 
also: as early as 1665 Oliver Cromwell sent an expedition 
to the Caribbean which, though badly defeated at Santo 
Domingo, successfully captured Jamaica. Spain, too weak to 
retaliate, allowed Jamaica to remain in British hands, 
after several half-hearted forays to retake it failed. 
4 
This expedition of Cromwell's formed part ot his "Western 
Design" to take over Panama and the rest or Central America 
in an effort to strangle Spain's hold on America. The plan 
never materialized further than the one expedition to 
Jamaica, but this toe-hold provided an unforseen resulti 
in 1667 Spain signed a treaty in Madrid, pledging 
friendship and agreeing to accept ~ritish trade in certain 
ports or America. Three years later, in an even more 
significant e.greement--the Second Treaty of Madrid--Spain 
recognized the right or countries other than itself and 
Portugal to colonize America.. Britain could legally keep 
its positions in the Caribbean and on the North American 
oontinent--which it had all intentions of doing anyway. 
Recognizing its holdings as something worth maintaining, 
Britain began building up these settlements, especially 
Jamaica and the Belize logwood cutting camps. 8 
The conquest or Jamaica gave the British forces an 
excellent base for buccaneering in the Caribbean. Belize 
became the next base, though it had been occupied for many 
years previously: woodcutters had already taken over what 
they called "Campeaohy" in 1659, and eleven years later 
Spain finally acknowledged their right to work in the area, 
after trying many times to dislodge the intruders. In the 
1680s, the British .lost all but a small area in Belize to 
armed Spanish colonists, though they had entrenched well. 
Spain never really accepted the woodcutters' right to 
5 
remain, though these, and the British Crown, adamantl7 
insisted on its 
in 1784, a commission from the Crown or Spain 
was authorized "to make a formal deliver7 to 
the British nation or the lands allotted for 
the cutting of logwood, &c." It is necessary 
to state this explicitly, because many persons 
are not only ignorant whether Honduras is an 
island or part of the continent, but very many, 
who are aware or the position of the 
settlements, think the British have merely a 
right to the logwood and mahogany cutting in 
the Bay or Honduras, and that it is not a 
territorial occupancy of the British Crown, 
w h i ch , in fa c t , i t i
9
a , a s m u o h as J a m a i ca or 
any other settlement. 
Because or the nature of the Spanish conquest, the 
north coast of Central America--having no great apparent 
mineral wealth--received sparse settlement, and 
consequently remained unprotected. Several British groups 
attempted to take advantage of this. One of the most 
formal, if lea.st suooessrul, came to be known as William 
Patterson's New Caledonia colony or Darien, in 1698. Two 
years after its demise, Governor Draz Pimienta of Cartagena 
dislodged a. second attempt by the British to colonize the 
Da.ridn area. 1 O 
Some fortification seemed necessary to the Spaniards, 
but on the whole this remained inadequate, and Dutch, 
British, and French corsairs made the area unsafe to 
inhabit. In 1643 Trujillo fell to Dutch pirates, though it 
had a small fort with 17 heavy guns and several smaller 
piecea. 11 Spanish settlers began asking Spain to send 
military governors to the Audiencias, to help with the 
defense of the colonies. They did not like the almost 
daily occurrences involving foreign pirates. Spanish 
authorities objected to Eritish encroachments and sent both 
armies and ships when colonists and woodcutters alike 
appealed to their respective governments for aid. Don Jose 
Vazquez de Prego, Captain-general of Guatemala in 1752, 
issued several successful orders to force the British to 
evacuate their settlements in Belize. During the next few 
years the woodcutters lost all but a couple of positions, 
1 i k e t h e f o r t a. t P o ya. , o n R:! o T i n t o • 1 2 
The Peace of Paris, signed on February 10, 1763, gave 
~rite.in the right to maintain logwood camps in return for 
an agreement to demolish any fortifications built in the 
disputed areas. Spain agreed to not disturb these 
settlements, allowing the baymen to build houses and 
magazines (warehouses). 13 Britain subscribed to a foreign 
policy dictating that any attack on a Spanish colony really 
did . not mean enmity with Spain, 1 ~ though they realized the 
point could not be pushedt the baymen were ordered to 
destroy their forts and lay no permanent claim on the land. 
Eut Spanish colonists could not be so easily satisfied--
they realized the English had never given up their 
intentions and claims on Valis (Belize), and so continued 
to harass the woodouttera.15 
7 
Spain needed a system of defense to solve the problem, 
if only to calm its citizens in the colonies. The 
question of how to establish one divided military and 
civilian theorists into two schools of thought: those for 
aggressive, open warfare, and those for passive, defensive 
warfare. The former advocated a line of forts to arm and 
supply a navy to sail and search out the pirates, 
destroying their base ports. They recognized in their 
enemies not an organized force with one headquarters and 
leader, but rather a disjointed bunch of individuals with 
one purpose. A defensive posture would only treat the 
symptoms, preventing attacks at specific locations. But an 
aggressive posture could eliminate the danger of any attack 
by destroying the pirates before they could do any damage. 
The second school of thought saw such a theory as 
dangerous, for it left the coasts basically undefended: 
who would protect the cities while the navy put to sea? 
After all, were one pirate under attack, no other would go 
to his rescue, but rather would seize the chance to pillage 
some other undefended Spanish towns. A superior system 
would be to fortify all major ports and allow trade only 
through them. This theory became more popular among the 
colonists, who preferred to see physical evidence of their 
defense. It is also possible that in this way the 
colonists could "keep tabs" on the Spanish navy, while 
dealing on the side with the same pirates and smugglers 
8 
they were supposed to be fighting. 1 6 Out of these two 
theories arose a series of fortifications to improve both 
Spain's claim to the area, and to defend the coasts from 
British incursions. 
Chapter Two: The Guatemalan Background 
Peru's Viceroy, the Duke of the Palata, saw control of 
the pirates as essentially a naval problem. His theory of 
aggressive defense played a. significant part later in the 
conception of the fort at Omoa, though nothing but discord 
resulted when he first expressed it. In 1667, Viceroy 
Conde de Lemos also foresaw aggressive action in the 
Caribbean as the solution to the increasingly frequent a.eta 
of piracy in the Pacific. Unfortunately the king, although . 
listening to Lemos' report, did nothing, ostensibly because 
he lacked funds. 1 
The President of the Guatemalan Audiencia, in 
compliance with Royal policy, asked all merchants to defend 
the Golfo Dulce, Santo Toms, and Puerto Caballos at their 
own expense. The merchants refused, claiming they already 
pa.id taxes for thati the King must provide adequate 
defenses for their wares. Taxes went to support the Armada 
de Barlovento, the Windward Navy, which defended the flota 
(fleet) in the Caribbean. In 1633 the King ordered that 
fleet to drop its Honduras squadron: all Central American 
trade had to go through Veracruz, in Mexico. 
The merchants of Guatemala, upon seeing the 
King's orders, must have calculated, as 
ob s e r v e s Gar oi a Pe 18. e z , t hat i f th e Ki n g • s 
money was not safe on his own ships or in his 
ports, neither would their merchandise be; and 
it would be better, to avoid risks, to follow 
9 
the road used by the royal couriers. Thus, 
the7 resolved to use the long overland road 
between Veracruz and Guatemala for their 
oommerce. 2 
10 
Spanish convoys, by law, had to be accompanied by two 
armed warships. But even when obeying this law, the 
merchants loaded the warships with so many goods that their 
fighting ability decreased drastically. In the seventeenth 
century Spain did not have a large enough navy to defend 
Central Amerioa--or any of the rest of the oolonies, for 
that matter. Every merchant ship could be pressed into 
military service, however, by merely placing one or two 
cannon on board with the officers to use them. Thus, the 
king saw no real need for a permanent royal navy.3 The 
fact that few ships carried armament or that the · king 
provided none seems to have been ignored or overlooked. 
Prestige did not provide protection from pirates, though 
some Spanish courtiers apparently thought so. The truth, 
as Fernandez Alvarez states, was quite the opposites 
The Spanish crown did not possess an 
Armada--an organized group of ships--to defend 
its oceanic routes from asaaults by its 
adversaries, or to attack its enemies when 
needed, that was as representative 0£ its power 
on the h!gh seas as its permanent armies were 
on land. 
European nations saw in America the possibility of 
enriching their positions vis-a-vis other nations. Eut 
because Spain and Portugal held a virtual ownership 
monopoly, it became difficult for them to get a foothold in 
I I 
America. Spain could fight off imperialist competitors on 
land, but remained woefully inadequate at sea. As a 
result, the Council of the Indies developed the flota 
system--the oonvo7--to send all trade in one 7earl7 or bi-
yearly fleet. To deal with this new system, pirates also 
changed tactics, attacking land positions to get at the 
merchandise in the warehouses. They also struck at single 
ships in a harbor after the fleet had split up, if only to 
ease their loading operations. 
Frequent wars in Europe left the coasts of Central 
America open to the corsairs· attacks b7 draining the 
manpower supply. As no regular troops guarded the 
colonies, haoendados (landowners) had to foot the bill for 
raising an army. On October 7, 1570, King Charles ordered 
all people living near seaports in the Americas to have 
weapons and horses ready, according to their abilities, to 
defend the area if enemies appeared. No one could be 
exempted from this duty, and the Viceroys or Presidents had 
to review these conditions every four months.5 All weapons 
had to be registered and licensed with the Council before 
' 
being transported to the coloniess if found otherwise, 
they would be confiscated and returned to Spain.6 
The king responded to a 164~ petition for a fort on the 
north coast of Central America by requesting the name of a 
bay and a budget proposal stating the source of the 
funding. No royal monies could be used for the project: 
The defense of the country was given completely 
over to the care 0£ private parties. Without 
soldiers, without arms, without supplies, 
without military leaders, what is strange is 
that Spain should have preserved this colon7, 
which had at a ver7 short distance from its 
north coasts, wily, ambitious enemies, used to 
war and to whom it would have cost very little 
to take them over.7 
12 
When the pirates changed tactics from the open seas to 
land positions, King Felipe II decided to build a system of 
defensive forts to protect principal ports. Only ports 
with cities or towns needed fortification at first, though 
Felipe had in mind defending all ports that might be useful 
to the pirates. 8 With this in mind, the Crown dispatched 
Flores de ValMs' squadron to the Straights of Magellan in 
15 81. Five years later Maestre de Campo Juan de Tejeda 
went to the Caribbean to fortify Panama and defend the 
transit trade from Peru. 
The problem did not appear to be the inability of the 
Spaniards to fight off piratess they had shown bravery 
many times. In 1578 John Oxenham looted Panama but lost 
his spoils to a hastily-assembled Panamanian army; in 1585 
Francis Drake attempted unsuccessfully to take Cartagena; 
in 1595 Drake again lost a battle, this time to the 
defenders of the fort at San Juan de Puerto Rico; Sir 
Thomas Baskerville met with defeat halfway across the 
Panamanian isthmus that same year.9 Administrators created 
most problemas when the Crown did send funds, they were 
spent on shady deals, contra.band speculation, and various 
13 
capricious follies. These abuses proved very difficult to 
remedy. 10 
In an attempt to override many problems, Juan Bautista. 
Antonelli, a military engineer, went to inspect the 
Caribbean defenses, returning to Spa.in in 1587. Together 
with Tiburcio Hispanoqui, the king's chief engineer, he 
drew up a new system based on the passive defense theory--
very popular in military circles at the time--calling for 
forts at Ha.bans., Sa.n Juan de Ulua., Puerto Rico, and 
Portobello. 11 By 1675 most usable harbors in the Caribbean 
housed some kind of fort, though these ha.d been built 
ma.inly by private capital and their design reflected 
private interests. They had been built for the most part 
against attacks by Indians: for instance, the one at Santo 
Domingo. Several did not even face the sea, and no effort 
ha.d been made to coordinate the defense system. 
protected trading centers only. 
The forts 
Antonelli's line of f 'orts eventually grew to stretch 
all a.long the Spanish Main and along the Caribbean coast to 
F 1 o r i d a. In C en t r a 1 A m e r i ca and t h e Yu c a tan , i t i n c 1 u d e d 
Pet~n Itza, San Felipe de Ba.calar, San Felipe del Golfo 
Dulce, Sa.n Fernando de Omoa, Trujillo, Inmaculada 
Concepci6n on the Rio Tinto, Inmacula.da. Concepci6n on the 
Rio San Juan, and San Fernando de Ma.tina.. 12 Other forts 
included San Marcos de Apalache, San Agustin de la Florida, 
I 
• 
Antonelli's fortification system 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5~ 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
# " Peten Itza 
San Felipe de Bacalar 
San Felipe del Golfo Dulce 
Bustamante de Santo Tomas 
San Fernando de Omoa 
Inmaculada Concepcitn del R{o Tinto 
Inmaculada Concepci6n del R{o San Juan 
San Fernando de Matina 
Trujillo 
14 
15 
Panzacola, Nueva Orleans, Luisiana Espanola, San Juan de 
Ulua on the island of Sacrificios (or Gallegos), Del 
Carmen, and Campeche. Castilla del Oro and Nueva Granada 
had their own series of fortifications. 13 
The history of fortification in the northern Spanish 
colonies can be divided into three main time periods. The 
first began during the reign of Felipe II (1556 to 1598), 
with the decision to organize the defense of the colonies 
under one master plan. Defense no longer depended on local 
initiative. The decision concerning which port to fortify 
(a decision usually made quite correctly) proved so easy to 
make, that even after thirty years the system survived, 
though poor construction or management caused some defeats 
at the hands of pirates. The second period comprised the 
reign of Felipe IV (1621 to 1665): Spain had lost much of 
its energy by then, and the system's inherent security no 
longer remained. Only minor improvements occurred on 
existing forts, and then not as efficiently as they should 
have been. The last time division came in the eighteenth 
century. Pirates no longer seriously or constantly 
threatened: European nations did, and Spain feared an 
imminent invasion of the colonies by its imperial rivals. 
Britain in particular posed a strong threat, but the 
excellence of the initial defensive structure did manage to 
keep the colonies intaot.14 
16 
Martin Carlos de Mancos became the first military 
President 0£ the Guatemalan Kingdom in 1659 and his task 
included improving the defenses along the north coasts of 
Central America. The British Nav1 had taken over the 
corsairs' harassment of the Spanish colonists, so Mancos 
began construction or the fort on the San Juan river in 
Nicaragua, to prevent an attack on Granada like the one 
that came in 1665. He instituted the practice of taxing 
local agricultural products to finance the projects of 
defense. 15 
But the whole system remained very confusingJ no 
Department of Defense existed in Spain, and hence, no 
budget. The king dictated all orders, causing at times 
serious problems, especially in timing. During a war, for 
instance, the captain-general became commanding officer, 
but he remained answerable to the king. 16 The pirates 
themselves caused most of the confusion over authority, in 
a way, because they simply did not have very much 
collective strength. Piracy had not become an obvious 
problem to the Spanish court, or at least one easily 
visible. Complaints abounded, but these did not affect 
Spain's prosperity directly. The royal engineer Antonelli 
wrote to the King thats 
the enemy has not yet attacked armed ports, but 
only open, poorly defended bays. To do so they 
would need larger siege equtfment than is 
allowed by the la7 of the land. 
17 
The colonists needed education, not forts. Teaching 
them how to use artillery and other war equipment would 
have been of immense value. After Drake's attacks in 
Central America between 1585 and 1590, the colonists had 
begun to lose their faith in forts, or at least in Spain's 
ability to defend them. Talking of the people, Juan de 
Tejeda wrote to the king: 
We have been advised not to depend on them even 
for the construction of a fort, or to defend it 
when completed; they only think about fleeing 
to the bush when an attack comes. Because of 
this, then, it is not surprising to recommend 
to the Council of the .Indies that the leading 
authority of the island [Santo DomingoJ be a 
man of arms, and not of letters. 18 
Jorge Juan wrote to the king in 1786 that all towns 
not under the protection of a fort had to defend themselves 
with volunteer militias. In this manner the crown could 
defend large areas of land without any expense to itselr. 19 
But militias proved scarce and ill-armed. At one point 
Guatemala had only one regiment of infantry, later reduced 
to a battalion of five fixed companies spread along its 
borders, and one brig~de of artillery. A total of 150 men 
made up the entire permanent army charged with defending 
Central America. Provincial cavalry and infantry could 
r e c r u i t ab o u t 1 0 , 0 0 0 u n t rained m en w h en n e e d e d • 2 0 J o s~ 
Rodriguez sums up the condition of the militias quite well: 
suffice it to know that the defense of the 
interests of the colonies, and those of Spain, 
were not placed into able hands. This is 
evident in seeing what the colonial militias 
did. They could not and should not be called a 
regular army. They are, instead, unthinking 
groups who obe7 the principles of terror, 
rather than those of the military moral code, 
based on discipline. To form a judgement on or 
to call an army what is basically a 
oomglom!fate of Indians, creoles, and slaves is 
absurd. 
18 
Major problems with existing forts included disrepair, 
inadequate weapons, difficulty in maintaining provisions 
and personnel, and funding--an item approved only on an 
emergency basis. 22 This seemingly inadequate line of forte 
had to stop the usurpation of Spanish territories by the 
English along the entire Caribbean coast. The Castillo de 
San Fernando de Omoa resulted directly from this explosive 
situation. 
Chapter Threes The Honduran Background 
Mention of the bays along the north coast of Honduras 
first reached Spa.in in 1524 when Gil Gonzalez n!vila threw 
overboard some dead horses from one of his ships. He named 
the bay he was anchored in after them--Puerto de Caballos. 1 
In 1539 Pedro de Alvarado used Puerto de Caba.llos, arriving 
"with three thick ships and three hundred harquebusiers and 
other many people. 112 He ordered 200 men to open a road 
through to San Pedro Sula, a task that took them ten days 
to complete. Alvarado requested the Cabildo (town 
counoil)--presumably of Guatemala--to send a mayor and two 
councilmen to demonstrate the settlements' importance. 
Alvarado may have requested the officials because he 
encountered legal troubles with his credentials as the 
representative of Hermn Cortez.3 
By the mid-16th century, Honduras boasted seven 
aettlements--at that · time often confusingly termed 
"oolonies"--the largest being Trujillo, with some fifty 
settlera.4 In 1584, the governor of Honduras, D. Rodrigo 
Ponce de Le6n, wrote a letter from Trujillo suggesting 
the port be £orti£ied, replacing the canteria 
and thatch warehouse with a strong fort built 
by an engineer. This fort should house four 
pieces of brass artillery, because Trujillo is 
very much worth defending from the pirates. 
Ponce also wrote the same for the bay of Puerto de 
Caballos.5 
19 
20 
In 1592 Puerto Caballos fell to a band of pirates, who 
reported having looted some 200 wealthy houses, their haul 
ammounting toi 
5 or 6 tuns or quicksilver, 16 tuns or old 
sacke, sheepe, young kids, great store or 
poultrie, some store or money, & good lirinen, 
silks, cotton-cloth, and such likeJ '6e also 
took three belles out of the church ••• 
Puerto Caballos had a more or less permanent 
settlement until march of 1604, when the discovery of 
Puerto Santo Tomas prompted the colonists to move the 
entire town to that bay. Santo Tomas had a more easily 
defensible bay, which made it a much better port of entry.7 
But the problem 0£ the pirates continued to plague the 
settlement, even at its new location. 
In 1677, Maestre de Campo Don Juan Francisco Saenz, 
governor or Guatemala, ordered the construction or a .fort 
at another bay in Central America, the port or Ma.tins., in 
Costa Rica, with a garrison of one hundred men. This 
order, however, did not go into effect until Governor 
Miguel G<Smez de Lara re-issued it five yea.rs la.ter.8 
By 1665, the British in Jamaica could easily harass the 
Guatemalan colonists and engage in rampant smuggling, 
defrauding the Spanish treasury of much-needed income. 
Fifteen years later, the British also settled the north 
coasts or Nicaragua and Honduras, known as the Moskitia, 
and allied themselves with the Indians living there. By 
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1744 they had named officials to govern the Miskitos, 
Colonel Robert Hodgson becoming "euperintendant" in that 
year. Spain vigorously protested this action, but found 
herself not interested enough in the area to retaliate.9 
Francisco de Montejo, the Adelantado to Yucatan and 
later Governor of Honduras-Hibueras, planned in 1537 an 
alternate trade route between Peru and Spain through 
Honduras, instead of Panama. Montejo proposed a route 
between the Gulf of Fonseca and Puerto Caballos, over a 
road through the valley or Comayagua. 10 Twenty-two years 
later the Audiencia de Guatemala worked on the project, 
finding many problems. Engineer Juan Garc!a de Hermosilla 
and Captain Pedro Ochoa Leguizam6n, mayor of Nicoya, had 
resurrected the plan to spite the royal engineer Juan 
Bautista Antonelli, who disapproved it.1 1 Antonelli had 
studied the plan and written to the king, sending a resume 
with recommendations: the road would simply be too long. 
At least 70 leguas 12 separated Puerto Caballos from the bay 
of Fonseca, and because the road could not accommodate 
carts, fourteen thousand mules would be required to carry 
merchandise through sparsely populated areas at least six 
times a year. In 1590 Antonelli sent a description of 
Puerto Caballos and the Bay of Fonseca, pointing out their 
weaknesses and their strengths. Nothing ever came of these 
p 1 an s , t h o ugh t he Au d i enc i a a p. en t m u c h m one y a t u d y in g 
them. 13 
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Montejo originall7 planned to consolidate Central 
America. San Pedro Sula and Comayagua would be the trading 
centers for Nicaragua and Guatemala at first. Later El 
Salvador and even Panama could be serviced from Honduras. 
The accountant, Cerezeda, the treasurer, Garc!a de Celis, a 
Mr. Pedraza, and Pedro de Alvarado discussed the plan 
together, and even presented it to the king, who rejected 
it merely by a.eking £or much more money and information 
than they could supply. After Bishop Francisco de 
Marroqu!n of Guatemala advocated the move, however, Felipe 
I I named a .com mis a ion consisting or Juan Me ji a , Pedro de 
Ochoa Leguizam6n, Field Marshall Juan de Tejeda, Captain 
Francisco Valverde and Engineer Bautista Antonelli to study 
the proposal. He later appeared to have approved the plans 
in principle, though in action nothing ever happened. 14 
Had it been approved and implemented, the bay at Omoa might 
have been fortified much earlier in an e£fort to protect 
the bay at Puerto Caballos, which Antonelli called "almost 
indefensible." 
There is some question over who sent in the first 
request or recommendation concerning a fort a.t Omoa. 
Calder6n Quijano gives the honor to Maestre de Campo Don 
Juan de Barrientos y Guzman, who sent word in 1743 to the 
king that a fort at the Ba.y of Omoa would stop or at least 
slow down considerably the volume of illicit trade in the 
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area. 15 The English, he reported, used the bay as a 
wintering port. When fortified, it could aid greatly in 
the protection of the entire Kingdom. Manuel Zapatero, in 
a much more recent study ( 1972), statesz 
definitely, it was the President of the 
Aud i en c i a , D. En r i q u e Enrique z , w h o w r o t e i n a 
letter to the Monarch Charles II, dated in 
1685, of the great possibility of the ports of 
Trujillo and Caballoa of falling into the power 
of the English, because of the ease with which 
the pirates could attack from Belize, with 
their allies the Zambo-Miskitos. Because of 
this, he said, there was an "extreme need" to 
fortify Omoa, a place unknown and unused as a 
p o r t • W i t h En ri q u e z o p e n s t h e in t e r e s t in 
Omoa, an~ to him belongs the first defensive 
oonc.ept. l 6 
Enr!quez asked for harquebusea instead of rifles, and 
for a military engineer to defend Guatemala. An engineer 
would cut the cost of defense, as well a.a increase the 
defenses, if only by planning a fort at Omoa. Enr!quez had 
raised 8,000 pesos for the project, mainly from donations 
by the town councils and the church. 
In July of 1751 two reports concerning Omoa showed the 
English occupying Roa.tan, Guanaja, Masaguera, and Utila so 
as to protect their compatriots in the R:!o Tinto a.rea.17 
So fortifying Omoa had two major advantagess to prevent 
further English incursions into the area, and to avoid the 
expense of rebuilding the redoubt and fort at Golfo Dulce. 
The new fort would have a much greater strategic value 
because of its new location. By adopting this kind of 
mentality, both Barrientos and Enr!quez appealed to the 
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militarists of the aggressive warfare theory. A centrally 
looated bay could defend a larger area with its navy, 
especially if it had the best port along the coast. 
According to Rubio Banchez, the forts at San Felipe, 
Matina and San Juan had been built to psychologically 
defend the north coasts: they were not strong enough to 
withstand an enemy attack, but they gave the colonists a 
sense or security. The Audiencia of Guatemala knew that, 
and wanted a strong fort, one which could properly defend 
the port or entry to the Kingdom. 18 
The first serious initiative for the construction of 
Omoa came from Don Joa~ Rodezno Manzolo y Rebolledo, an 
oidor (judge) and member of the Real Audiencia of 
Guatemala. In a letter to the king dated March 4, 1723, 
Rodezno recommended a fort at Omoa to decrease the volume 
of illegal trade going on there. Rodezno had been named 
oidor supernumerario (supernumerary judge) on the 16th of 
May, 1710, taking office the following March 16. He spent 
the next twelve years spying on royal officers in Honduras, 
to see how many were involved in illegal smuggling with the 
Eritish pirates. Returning from that commission on January 
22, 1722, he reported to the king the following year the 
results of his investigation. The recommendation of a 
fort, he claimed, he sent only in service of the king, for 
its implementation would cause serious unrest in the area--
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which it did, as will be seen later. But the fort could 
serve to infuse life into a dead province, to rebuild its 
economy, to stimulate enough trade to resurrect the then-
illegal Honduras-Havana trade route.19 Rodezno~s plan 
included financing the construction with the sale of 4,500 
arrobas 20 of Zarsa (sarsaparilla). The garrison at the 
fort of Golfo Dulce, which even the British considered 
useless, could be transported to Omoa, as it only defended 
the seldom-used warehouses. 
Rodezno, like the engineer Luis Diez Navarro after 
him, advised making the commander of Omoa governor and 
captain-general of the province, for the sake of 
efficiency. Since as yet no military engineer worked in 
the Kingdom, he asked the Viceroy of New Spain to send one 
for the job, recommending Don Diego Guti~rrez de 
Arguelles. 21 His description of Omoa, however, was quite 
inaccurate. He compared it to San Felipe de Golfo Dulcet 
Everything is diametrically opposed in said 
port of Omoas its temperature is healthful, it 
has a beautiful bay with a port seven arm 
lengths deep C 11.7 metere2, clear water, and 
is large enough to accommodate any warship. 
The latter can take ~~ver near the site where a 
fort can be erected. 
This description could not in part be farther from the 
truth: Alcedo noted that "its weather was the most 
unhealtful of America." 2 3 Later on, throughout the 
construction of the fort, the battle with the climate 
claimed many lives.24 
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But Rodezno's report continued, enumerating about 
twenty varieties of fruit that grew there--fruit that could 
be abundant if properly exploited. He sent a map and a 
p 1 a. n for th e r or t , d r a w n up by 0 no fr e Nd n e z , a pr i e s t , i n 
the absence of a military engineer or an architect. Wfiez' 
maps, while being accurate, had been very sloppily and 
carelessly drawn, for he apparently did not have much 
training as a draftsman. The plans showed a quadrangular 
fort of the bulwarked system, which D. Sebastian Fermndez 
de Medrano, teacher and director of the Academia Real y 
Militar de los Paisea Bajoa, had declared the best possible 
style. 2 5 The style followed that of the Field Marshal 
Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, Royal engineer of Louis XVI 
of Frances renaissance, baroque, and neoclassic at one 
time--a very popular combination during the sixteenth 
through nineteenth centuries. 
The plans showed, by impressive and sophisticated-
looking line charts, the areas covered by cannonfire. 
Technically, the bulwarked system was one of the best, for 
-
it left no wall undefended1 cannon could shoot parallel to 
all of the outside walls. Nunez' fort measured 800 feet 
"de brabante", the faces 351 feet long, the flanks 106, and 
the curtains 480. He expressed the opinion that although 
most people wanted the fort pl~ced on "point 83" on his 
map--probably the north point--it should be farther south 
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at the deepest end of the bay. Some of those who disagreed 
later included the Conde de Aranda, who designed the fort, 
engineer Luis Diez de Navarro, who started the 
construction, and engineer Francisco Alvarado, who 
c o mp 1 e t e d i t • As i t t urned out , Nu ii e z ' s i t e 1 at er prov e d 
the better one, and became the site for the conetruction.26 
But NUnez was no engineer. Rather, he was an amateur 
who apparently had travelled through France and had become 
acquainted with the new Vauban style. His plans did not 
convince the Council of the Indies, which sent a memo to 
the king on the third of September, 1723, informing him 
that the report merely reflected the opinions of Rodezno 
and Nunez. More plans to confirm the validity of these 
opinions should be ordered, preferably by the government of 
the Captaincy-general. On February 16, 1724, Rodezno's 
request finally received validation, but no action ever 
came from it.27 Proof that Rodezno's report did not 
receive much credit in the Court can be seen when on July 
2 5 , 1 7 4 0 , Don Pe d r o de R i be r a y Vi 11a16 n , pr e s id en t of 
Guatemala, reported receiving orders on the firs .t of 
October to fortify Trujillo and Matina. These would form 
part of the system of defense covering the entire north 
coast from Matina through Bluefielde, and Cape Graciae a 
Dios to Trujillo. 28 But as no military engineer had 
arrived in the Kingdom yet, nothing could be done. 
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On April 12, 1745, Ribera recommended to the king 
another plan to fortify Omoa.. Thie time, unfortunately, 
his recommendation clashed with current plans to reduce 
fortif7ing Central America because of a new Madrid 
Agreement with England. Nevertheless, the Council of the 
Indies passed a motion to transfer all the plans for an1 
f or t on the Ca r i b b ea n t o Z e n6 n d e So mod e vi 11 a , Mar q u e z d e 
la Ensenada.. Appointed to the Council in 1743 for the 
reorganization of the defenses of the Spanish colonies, his 
plans to force the British from the Caribbean entailed 
force of arms. This aggressive policy diverted the Spanish 
offensive from the Black River in the Moskitia area to 
Belize. But the reality of Spain's economy clashed with 
Somodevilla'e plansz he could not afford to both fortify 
and fight. Sensing that successful fighting might keep his 
name in the king's favor more easil7, he sent armies into 
Belize during Vazquez Prego's term as Captain-general of 
Guatemala, to expel the woodcutters who reinforced 
Britain,s claim to the area. Funds allotted for the 
project at Omoa. had to be used to pay the army in Belize, 
further delaying construction of the fort.29 
Somodevilla's policies seem ver1 confusing, possibly 
not very well thought through. He eagerl1 favored the 
proposed Omoa project, and probably helped insure its Royal 
approval by choosing the name San Fernando, after the king 
whose favorite minister he had become.30 Nonetheless, his 
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orders to send armies to Belize did hinder financing the 
construction of the fort. 
After careful planning, Somodevilla issued new orders: 
Colonel Juan de Vera received the Commandancia General de 
Armas (military commandancy) in Comayagua, and Alonso 
Fermndez de Heredia the Lieutenant-colonelcy in charge of 
L e6 n . Th i s , in e ff e c t , 1 o w e r e d t h e capt a i n c y - gene r a l ' s 
military job in Guatemala to that of a quartermaster. The 
responsibility for the construction of Omoa fell to Vera. 
But Vera also delayed the project because he lacked an 
engineer, the only one available being tied up in repairing 
the fort at Inmaculada Concepci6n in Nicaragua. The 
engineer, during an inspection tour, had found himself 
named Castellano (commander) by Fermndez when the previous 
commander at the fort had died. Then Vera died in 1747, 
and Fermndez took on the leadership of Comayagua, while at 
the same time holding down his job in Nicaragua.31 
Chapter Four: The Early Years; Luis D!ez Navarro 
A shortage of military engineers created the biggest 
initial problem surrounding the construction at Omoa. More 
work existed than engineers to plan and do it, so low 
priority areas had to wait until they became important 
before having an engineer assigned to them. The title 
Military Engineer only meant that the holder had joined the 
military for his training: he could plan towns and 
civilian buildings as well as military installations. 
Finally, on the twenty-fourth of March, 1741, a 
transfer order was issued for a fifty-year-old Lieutenant, 
engineer extra-ordinary, to move to the Captaincy-general 
of Guatemala: 
Having heard what D. Pedro Ribera has reported 
on December 15, 1739, and on May 15, 17110, and 
what has been reported in the Council of Indies 
on December 17, 17JJO, His Majesty has resolved 
to move the engineer extraordinary D. Luis Drez 
Navarro to Guatemala City from Mexico City, to 
put into effect the orders of the mentioned D. 
Pedro Ribera on the construction of the forts 
planned, one at the mouth of the Matina river, 
and one at Trujillo, to defend the provinces: 
from His Majesty's orders I instruct you to 
execute these with all due haste. 1 
A year later Luis Diez Navarro left his work on the 
new mint of Mexico City and probably accompanied Tomas 
Rivera y Santa Cruz, the new Captain-general replacing 
Pedro Ribera, to Guatemala. There is, however, some 
confusion as to exactly when he went to Guatemala. The 
30 
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Royal Order on March 24 sent him to sound bays, landings, 
and to study the possibilities for a permanent rort. 2 
Later, reportedly after having been in Guatemala City for 
some time, his name was submitted to a vote for a 
commission as visitador (inspector), on December 23, 17JJ2. 
Rivera y Santa Cruz approved the trip, though Drez may not 
have received notice to leave until January 9, 1743. The 
confusion arises over where he worked in Mexico City when 
his marching orders arrived, and whether Diez arrived in 
Guatemala in 1742 or in 1743.3 The solution depends on 
which source is consulted. nrez himself wrotea 
through a Royal Order of March 24, 1741, 
received while in Mexico City, I was instructed 
to go to this capital Guatemala to put into 
effect the construction of the two forts at Rro 
Matina and the port of Trujillo; I obeyed the 
order by leaving Mexico in July of last year, 
1742, and presented myself to Your Excellency 
with my credentials •••• 4 
Later, he wrote in 1773, "it will be thirty-one years ago 
next October (after seeing I was in Mexico, and Veracruz) 
that I arrived in this capital of Guatemala n5 • • • • 
Di e z b e c a m e one of t h e m o s t out s tan di n g e n g 1 n e e r s in 
the Indies. A native of li!laga, his military career began 
before the age of 17, when he went to the Spanish forts of 
Africa in 1718 with the Segundo Cuerpo de la Real 
Artiller!a--the Royal artillery. After working some time 
in Barcelona in 1720, he spent three years as one of the 
first students in the Real y Militar Academia founded by 
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Vauban; apparently distinguishing himself very well in 
oivil engineering. He worked for a short time in 
Gibraltar, and then went, recommended by Vauban, to work 
under Ignacio Sala in Cadiz, where he learned the famous 
"poligdn cuadrado" fortification system. 6 
In 1732, after moving to the Americas--first of all to 
Veraoruz--he worked at the fort of San Juan de Ulua. 
Moving on to Mexico City, he built a new mint, blueprinted 
and modified a mill, and helped design the drainage of 
Mexico City (Lake Texcoco). Just when he began to build 
the Royal Hospital of the Indies, he received the 
appointment to the Kingdom of Guatemala to oversee the 
fortification of the north coast of Central America. 
His first job in Guatemala involved rebuilding the 
forts at Matina and Trujillo. Instead of starting on these 
immediately, he began his inspection tour, during which he 
divised the plans and recommendations for the fort of San 
Fernando de Omoa~ After starting to build this fort, he 
received a transfer in 1756 back to Guatemala City to 
oversee all constructions in the Kingdom.7 His rapid rise 
through the ranks of the military may not have been totally 
based on merits the promotion to ingenier~ ordinario 
(ordinary engineer) and to Lieutenant of the Infantry, 
along with the ensuing salary increase to 1000 pesos a 
year 8 may have been to sweeten the transfer from the 
33 
capital of New Spain to the relatively unimportant poet in 
Guatemala.9 
Soon after his arrival in Guatemala, J>iez had been 
appointed as a Visitador General de los Presidios (general 
inspector of the forts) to carry out a general survey of 
the defenses of the Kingdom. He received the power to take 
declarations and oaths from officials and leading citizens 
concerning any matter he deemed important. He requested 
the appointment of Jeronimo de Rosal, a friend from Spain, 
as his Lieutenant, and had him appointed as such on January 
2, 17113. 10 Zapatero adds that Drez" orders included giving 
an opinion concerning the situation at Omoa. 11 Later that 
month he began his ins'pection tour with a report of San 
Felipe del Golfo Dulce, which he had not seen yet. As the 
British had begun creeping into Peten and the Rio Walis 
(Belize) area again, a fort at that location would be a 
good idea, but the bay was simply too shallow to warrant 
the expense, and besides, the British could probably take 
anything re-erected there very easily. 12 This fort had 
long been ignored by the enemy, who considered it basically 
useless. 
On February 23, Di'.ez arrived in Comayagua and met with 
the military leaders to determine their opinions concerning 
a permanent installation on the north coastline. Juan de 
Barrientos y Guzman, the Lieutenant-Governor of the 
province, quickly declared in favor of the Omoa site. 
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Francisco Antonio Irache preferred the established port of 
Trujillo, but expressed concern over the extreme cost or 
rebuilding the defenses. The rest of the leaders, Joe~ 
Lope a Pod i6, Fe 1 i p e Grajeda., Fe 11 x de Hon t~ e, Car 1 o s 
Ortega, and Juan Pacheco, followed Barrientos in supporting 
the Omoa location.13 Drez then visited the bay itself, on 
the eleventh or March, in company with the Governor and 
other locals acquainted with the areas Captain Francisco 
Antonio Iraohe, Lieutenant Joseph L6pez, ship Captain 
Domingo Podi6, Captain .Felipe Grajeda of the Infantry of 
Blacks and his assistant Felix de Montes, Juan Pacheco and 
Juan de Buena Ventura, probably the scouts assigned to 
patrol the bay, Phelipe Santiago, Juan Mallorca, U!za.ro de 
Castro, and Cavalry Lieutenant Carlos de Ortega. 1 ~ 
The following month, on March 23, Diez reached Yoro, 
the nearest safe Spanish settlement to Trujillo. After 
being advised by all the town leaders not to risk personal 
danger by visiting Trujillo, he sent his lieutenant 
Ger6nimo de Rosai to scout the area. With the latter's 
report in hand, D!ez called a meeting in the town hall and 
received support for recommending Omoa as a preferable site 
for a. new fort, rather than rebuilding Trujillo. 
Trujillo could not be considered a very good place to 
fortify for at lea.st one major reasons low strategic value 
because or a wide open, shallow bay. Being close to 
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Roatan; any fortification could be easily taken by English 
baymen living there. The pirates, according to local 
reports, had even been taking bricks from the demolished 
Spanish garrisons to build their houses on Roatan. In a 
letter report to the king, Ili'.ez listed many reasons for his 
decision to abandon Trujillo in favor of Omoa. The latter 
had a more easily defensible bay: Miskitos and Zambos did 
not control the roads to Omoa from the interior, whereas 
all the paths to Trujillo were in their hands; thus the 
Register ship could dock at Omoa and transport goods 
overland to Guatemala in relative safety. Omoa, close to 
many other ports, could prevent illegal smuggling in such 
areas as Chamelec6n, Sula, Los Leones, Sal, el Play6n de 
Triunfo de Cruz, and several others. Thus Diez showed his 
purpose for the fort to be an aggressive one, to search out 
and destroy the pirates before they came to wreak havoc on 
Spanish towns: 
His Majesty can easily place .his corsair 
ships in the shelter of this port and easily 
destroy the English town~ again, and stop their 
commerce with Trujillo. 1 
Only docile Xicaque Indians, afraid of the English and 
enemies of the Zambos and Miskitos, lived in the 
surrounding areas. Trujillo provided too large a bay, one 
that would take several forts to defend, with a port just 
too inconvenient to justify such an expense. The areas 
Trujillo catered to (Sonaguera, San Jorge Olancho, and 
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Olanoho Viejo) had also been known to aid English 
smuggling, so moving the port of entry for the Register 
ships would also serve to punish these delinquent towns, 
by taking that commerce away from them. 16 
Before continuing his trip onward to Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica, nrez sent back to Guatemala a plan for a square 
shaped fort at Omoa: 
It is a project of a quadrangular fort, situated 
in the interior part of the oriental point of 
the inlet elevated over a platform and with an 
esplanade that presents shade to achieve a 
greater overhang. It has four bulwarks 
corresponding to the angles of the fort, each 
one flanking two gun emplacements. The 
buildings are all in the interior of the 
fortified enclosure, leaving in the f enter a 
large extension for the weapons plaza. 1 
This design, like several subsequent editions, did not 
receive approval. Salvatierra. mentions plans for an 
octogonal star-shaped fort, and an a.mended plan submitted 
later with a length of 106 feet, a width of 126 feet, and 
an outside diameter of 639 feet.18 
Upon arriving in Nicaragua, Diez served as the mayor 
and commander of the fort of Inmaculada Concepci6n on the 
R:! o San Juan , w h e r e t h e pre v i o u s may o r had ju s t di ed. 
Later, in Costa Rica, he found a similar situation: Don 
Juan Germin y Leonart had just died, so Diez, as ranking 
officer, took over as interim governor of Costa Rica. 
Brigadier Don Alonzo Hermndez de Heredia of the Audiencia 
de los Confines later regularized his appointment on 
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January 20, 1748, and D!ez remained there for three yearsi 
his rank rose to Ingeniero en Segundo (engineer, second 
grade) and Captain of the Infantry. 19 
Between 1751 and 1755, Diez had time to work on his 
original plan--the actual fort at Omoa. A year after his 
arrival at the site, he rose in rank to Chief Engineer and 
Lieutenant Colonel of the Infantry. After 1755 he 
personally built only civilian buildings, despite his 
military appointment the following year as Director of 
Engineers, Reviewer of Land Measurements (surveyors), and 
full Colonel in the Infantry. 2 0 On November 30, 1758, nlez 
applied to Secretary of the Indies Julian de Arriaga for 
permission to return to Spain permanently. His letter, 
written officially, and signed as the Director Engineer and 
Colonel, resulted from a bitter enmity with the Captain-
general, Arcos y Moreno. Diez, ill from a recent trip to 
Omoa, had apparently reached the end of his patience with 
Arcos.21 This letter provides most of the biographical 
material available on Diez, for he gave Arriaga a resume of 
his life and work. The request being turned down, he 
remained in Guatemala, where he died on the eleventh of 
April of 1780, after having seen the official completion, 
loss and recuperation of his pet project at Omoa. 
After returning to Guatemala City in 1751, Diez drew up 
plans for a comprehensive military defense system in 
Central America. He outlined key locations where 
38 
fortifications could be built ae a starting point for 
offensives against British settlements in Belize and the 
Hoskitia. Of these, Omoa. would be the largeets it would 
signal commitment to a permanent return or Spanish 
authority to the north coast. Diez sent his plans along 
with the report of his survey to Spain on the seventh of 
April, 17115, and repeated them in hie letter of 1751. The 
chapters on Omoa. gave an accurate description of the 
coastal topography, placing the bay itself at seventeen 
leagues from Golfo Dulce, 141 from Guatemala., sixteen from 
San Pedro Sula, twelve from Candelaria. Vieja., and sixty-two 
from Comaya.gua. D!ez described Omoa. as the best bay in 
Central America.a clean, safe, with a cape.city for 
approximately twenty-five ships at anchor at one time. 
This port is the most secure, clean and 
sheltered of all the Coast of Honduras, for 
which motive it has appeared to me appropriate 
that it be fortified, at less cost and risk, 
than any other of said coasts it offers many 
accomodations, and very favorable oon~~quences 
for this kingdom, which I shall state. 
D!ez listed thirteen reasons to fortify Omoa. The 
fort could assist in restocking corsairs armed by the king 
of Spain. Register ships could anchor easilya it had a 
good bay for repairing ships, as well as "much cedar wood." 
The Register could load with dyes, cacao, indigo, 
Brazilwood, vanilla, "exquiai·te balms," honey, wax, and 
other things cultivated in nearby regions. This commerce 
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oould help populate the town of Omoa and surrounding areas. 
More importantly, defense would prevent use of the bay by 
pirates, which would benefit the Crown by bringing safety 
to the region. A navy could be equipped to wage war on 
pirates in places like the island of Roatan and the Miskito 
coast, 
coasts so infested by enemies and pirates who, 
finding such places alone and undefended, 
inhabit and harass them. Add to that the 
damage they can cause and the intimidation of 
the settlers, with the embarrassment they cause 
by moving within sight or the construction 
site, it would serve them right to extirpate 
and exile the pirates from these seas and 
habitations, a thing which could without a 
doubt be accomplished, with time. 23 
An aggressive policy had to be used to expel the 
illegals from the area, because without opposition they 
continued to spread and strengthen, by their mere presence, 
a claim on the land, to Spain's detriment. 
His Majesty's corsair ships could easily be armed and 
would be very close in said port (Omoa,7 to the coast 
of Valis ~BelizeJ (which they could reach in three 
days) and to the cape of Gracias a Dios and the Gulf 
of Matina. With this kind or protection the Miskito 
Indians and Zambos and the English settlements on this 
coast should lessen day by d~y, and it will not be 
1 on g before the Eng 1 i sh s et t 1 e m en t s in Ri o Tint o and 
R o a tti n w i 11 be c o me uni n ha bi t e d , by ta. k in g aw a y t h e i r 
hope of continuing to trade illegally with the Spanish 
on these coasts, which is why said nation has allowed 
them to settle here. 
And it would be profitable to both of Your 
Majesties to expel them from these coasts, because its 
closeness to the homes of Zambos and Hi~\itos allows 
them to disturb our operations with ease. 
The lands surrounding Omoa appeared to be very 
fertile, and only 140 leagues separated the port from 
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Diez' second plan to fortify Omoa. 
4 I 
Guatemala.25 In hie recommendation, D!ez requested the 
transport or carpenters, brickmasons, blacksmiths, 
calafetes (ship carpenters), tailors, and cobblers--a 
shortage of these skills plagued the entire kingdom. 
Artillery experts also could be ueed to train the locals in 
the art of modern warfare. 
Other ports could be served from Omoas Bacalar, at a 
distance of five days of travelJ Balis (Belize), at two 
daysJ Havana, at about fifteen; Guanabacoa at eightJ 
Cabo Gracias at three to eight, depending on the windJ and 
Matina at five to twelve, also depending on wind 
conditions. These distances showed even more proof of the 
central, strategic location of Omoa.26 
Apparently Diez' plans for the fort had not been 
accepted in Spain, for he reinforced them by sending what 
is now called the second project to fortify Omoa, on the 
14th of April, 1745. 2 7 The blueprints corresponded to a 
square fort, with four bulwarks in proportion to the 
square--a very well planned fort. The moat would be 15 
varas wide, 2 8 though the normal moat usually measured ~2J 
the landfills sloped out only 25 varas, instead of the 
normal 601 a smaller-than-normal fort called for smaller-
than-normal supporting structures. A parapet wall and 
drawbridge served as exit, and accommodations included a 
permanent garrison for four hundred men, with emergency 
room for two hundred more. As to the garrison, 
it should be equipped with 400 men1 200 of 
which should be peninsular Spaniards, veterans 
of the army, and if they could be married it 
would .be very convenient to the Royal Service 
(even though it is contrary to the Royal Orders 
which in these Countries cannot be followed to 
the letter) with which two propitious things 
can be obtainedz firstly, the most assurance 
that they live quietly and free from the much 
chasing bachelors are subject to in this 
kingdom of the sin of carnal delight; and 
secondly, that having their women and children 
in the castle, they will not escape (deaer~ 
easilyJ within a few years they will become 
honorabl~ inhabitants throughout the 
province. 2 Y 
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Keeping in mind the king's decree to reduce the size 
of the forts in the Indies, Drez knew he would have trouble 
in recommending a fort to hold 400 men. But if built, Omoa 
would carry the defense of the entire Kingdom, so no risk 
should be taken that enemies of the king would laugh at the 
fort.30 Writing about the commandant of the new fort, Drez 
recommended "it would also be convenient that he be a 
military man, and not just any fellow countryman [Spaniard) 
as I have always seen them send .• "3 1 • • 
According to Calder6n Quijano, D!ez sent these plans, 
along with a recommendation not to leave the bay to the 
Zambos and smugglers, in July of 1744. Zapatero gives 
three dates for the sending of plansz the one he labels 
the second plan he dates in 1745--"Plans of a fort 
projected to fortify the port of Omoa," with a scale of 
450 Fies de Francia (scale feet). The other two plane he 
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dates earlier& one in 1743, "Plans of a fort projected for 
the fortification of the port of Omoa which is situated on 
the north sea on the coast of Honduras," with a scale of 
500 feetJ the other dated 1744, "Plans of the bay, and Port 
of Omoa," with a square fort on the scale of 250 varas of 
Castille.3 2 
The report given in Garc!a Pelaez' book contrasts the 
differences between Omoa and Trujillo. The latter had no 
safe inland access, as all the roads leading there had 
been under the control of the zambos for some time. For 
this reason the Register ship from Spain could never land 
there safely. Besides, Omoa would be much cheaper to 
build. Even the fertility of the land and the 
reinstatemant of trade between Guatemala and Havana, 
prohibited by the king due to its lack of safety, was used 
as an excuse to fortify Omoa.33 
Despite a law to the contrary,34 D!ez proposed that the 
commander of the fort be governor of a new political 
organization called the Coast of Honduras, which would 
include Gracias, San Pedro Sula, San Jorge Olanchito, 
Gracia.a a Dios, and Trujillo; Comayagua should be reduced 
from a state capital to a regional capital. Increased 
military and governmental efficiency would result.35 If 
the commanding officer of the fort were also governor of 
the new province, it would cut bureaucracy by not having to 
route paperwork through Comayagua. The governor could 
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receive taxes from the money and minerals from the Honduras 
mines, and deal more effectively with British smugglers 
and pirates. 
King Fernando VI and the accountant of the Council of 
Indies agreed in principle to the fortification, if only 
because Trujillo could prove too costly to defend. Diez' 
report of April 12, 1745, along with Rivera's letters 
recommending the fort on April 12, 1745, probably changed 
the King's mind. Rivera wrote that although the fort 
clashed with Royal intentions to reduce military spending, 
it could be built with the surplus 221,000 pesos he had 
sent to the court earlier that year.36 
In the meantime, preparations had been made for the 
construction. Juan de Vera, the governor of Honduras, 
asked the Marquez de la Ensenada for artillery to defend 
the site, suggesting Campeche, Golfo Dulce, and Cartagena 
as possible sources: all three responded positively by 
sending cannon.37 Two scouts went to watch the bay and 
report any ship movement in the area; they shared a salary 
of 1,277 pesos, presumably annually.38 
Changes in the administration in Guatemala hindered the 
progress of the program more than anything else. Jose 
Araujo y Rio became Captain-general on September 23, 1748. 
The following December 21 Colonel Pantaloon Imiiez received 
orders to replace the deceased Vera in Honduras, but he 
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took several months to arrive. By 1750 IMiiez had been 
replaced by Fer?Bndez de Heredia. Fer?Bndez asked Ensenada 
to appoint a military adjunct in Guatemala. to take charge 
of all military construction, as the current President, 
Tonne de Ribera, very slow to act, opposed any ideas other 
than hie own, acting offended when anyone showed 
initiative--such as when Fermndez took over the leadership 
in Honduras.39 
On January 17, 1752, Mariscal del Campo D. Jose Prego 
Montaoz y Soto Mayor, the new Captain-general, sought to 
implement Diez' fortification system by giving orders on 
the twenty-eighth of the same month to begin construction 
at Omoa. He asked the President of the Royal Coffers to 
ready funds--50,000 pesos to begin with, and a reserve of 
61,642 pesos. Jose Antonio Palma received the military 
commander's post at the site, and Luis Guasco became Sobre-
esta.nte, or euperintendant, of the works. A rations 
schedule was drawn up: Sunday and Thursday, six ounces of 
bacon; Monday and Wednesday, eight ounces of salt meat if 
at sea, and fresh while on land; Saturday, five ounces of 
cheese. Every da.y the troops would receive four 
cuartilloe (quarts) of water--three to drink and one to 
cook with, plus 24 ounces of firewood. This ration 
schedule became the biggest single expense to the Roya.1 
Coffers. At first all supplies had to come by sea, which 
ca.used some problems because some of the sailors, fearing 
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Omoa's reputation as a place of death, deserted when they 
found out their ship's destination. To counter this, Prego 
ordered all deserters arrested, and anyone aiding them 
punished and charged for any damages caused. The King sent 
3,000 muskets with bayonets, plus flints and bullets to the 
new garrison.40 
Prego died the following year after falling ill during 
a trip to Omoa. He had, however, altered the blueprints 
for the fort:4 1 on the twenty-fifth of April, 1752, he met 
with a Council of War and declared the fort designed by 
Diez too big. Prego believed a garrison of 200 men and a 
circular redoubt along the beach would be sufficient. The 
length should be only 130 to 150 varas, instead of the 470 
Diez called for. Two members of the Audiencia, Don Pedro 
de Superviela and Jorge Juan, believed an even smaller 
garrison--80 to 100 men--would meet the needs of the port. 
A structure of one-tenth the size Diez recommended could 
house the men, and should be planned according to the 
topography of _the area.4 2 The committee also voiced the 
opinion--a correct one--that the pirates could not be 
stopped. The only real defense could be nature itself, in 
the humidity, the sterile land, and the high incidence of 
disease, because inlets and islands they could hole up in 
abounded. The only reason to defend an area like Omoa 
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would be as an offensive measure, to a.rm and stock a fleet 
against the British.43 
The Council of Var in Guatemala wrote up a plan for 
the defense of its north coasts, emphasizing the need for a 
coast guard fleet. They felt the British and Miskitos were 
getting away with too much illegal commerce, and needed to 
be stopped. The planned coast guard, the Council 
projected, should consist of squadrons of five vessels 
each--a ship, a frigate, a jabeque, and two piroguea of 
differing capacities. The pirogue could travel up rivers 
farther than the rest, but were too small to cope with 
ocean-going frigates and ships. Thus each vessel in the 
squadron would complement the rest, making it an effective 
weapon against all types of pirate ships. This coast guard 
could possibly tame the islands and coasts inhabited by the 
pirates and Hiekitos. 
But the Council went a. step further in its 
recommendation of this coast guard, · pointing out the need 
for one or more safe ports from which to base its 
activities. These ports could not be "merely lost beaches, 
or open roadstead, or the like, but rather ports large 
enough to shelter the entire fleet. 11 411 There were no 
rivers large enough to accomodate ships, thus ruling out 
the forts at Golfo Dulce, R!o San Juan, and the Matins. 
river. The port at Omoa would be the best, following the 
opinion of the engineer D!ez, though it was rather far from 
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the bases of the English and Miskitos. Trujillo, the 
lagoon of Nicaragua, and the river mouth at Matina, though 
poor locations, coincided with the distances between forts 
the Council wanted. They thought it incredible that of all 
the ports and bays or the Caribbean coast, only Puerto 
Caballos had a bay large enough to compare with Omoa, and 
it was too close to the latter to be of any uae.45 
So Omoa became the site for this proposed fort. Its 
intention was aggressivez to serve as a base of operations 
for a fleet of corsairs who would patrol the coasts and 
attack the pirates in their home ports. It is interesting 
to note that at no time did anyone consider a fort on the 
Bay Islands. After forcing the pirates from that location, 
such a fort could have done more to assert Spanish 
authority than any on the mainland. That, of course, would 
have meant conquering the islands first and then fortifying 
them, which would have cost the Crown much more money than 
any mainland fort. 
Chapter Fivei The First Construction Period 
Action during the 7ears 1753 through 1755 proved slow 
at Omoa. mez reported having been assigned the soldiers, 
weapons and ammunition needed, though he lacked the 
artillery (20 and 25 pounds) to mount on the low redoubt 
under oonetruotion to protect the site. He expressed an 
interest in being appointed as chief engineer, requesting 
that I be the engineer assigned to the 
construction because of my training in that 
field, and having come to these Kingdoms to 
practice that era.ft under the orders of my 
superiors and of Hie Majesty, ~othing impedes 
me to accept the responsibility. 
Several major problems had to be surmounted. A second 
engineer had to be found in case Diez became ill or died. 
Negroes, more suited than Indians or Spaniards for labor in 
the coastal regions, had to be brought from far away, as 
did food and supplies. One of the most pressing shortages 
was that of funds. The Viceroy of New Spain promised 
100,000 pesos per year for the project, but that apparently 
did not cover all expensea.2 
Arcos y Moreno replaced Prego as Captain-general on 
January 29, 1752. The following April 15th, he promoted 
Diez to Lieutenant-colonel, and as such, the commanding 
officer at Omoa. That year D!ez drew a map of the area, 
showing the roads to Puerto Caballos, the Omoa River, and 
the soundings of the port, and a drawing of the low redoubt 
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or El Real, to be built to protect the oonstruction--or as 
Zapatero put it, "El Real, which was made or stakes and 
pieces of trees, for a protection, while the Work is being 
made."3 
A very useful member joined the staff' in November or 
17521 medical doctor Abundio Salom6n. Many workers had 
died because or the bad climate, so the Audienoia saw fit 
to pay Salom6n fifty pesos a month to try to stop the 
malaria and yellow fever common to the port.4 Attempts to 
do so had not been very sucoessfula :nrez himself lost his 
wife and three eldest daughters in 1748, after having moved 
with them to the fort to set an example and raise morale 
among those stationed there.5 
Later, Diez wrote a detailed expense report, listing 
all financial activity under hie charge from April 7, 175~, 
through February 20, 1755, and submitted it to Arcos as 
requested. Other than having detained a sloop temporarily, 
nothing worth writing about had occurred. The Council of 
the Indies caused most of the delays the Captain-general 
complained about, though this could not be seen in 
Guatemala. Arcos wrote a letter to the Council, accusing 
Diez of being lazy and of spending money needlessly, not 
realizing that the court itself caused the delays by not 
approving any plans for Diez to use. Diez continued to 
send blueprints to Spain for approval1 in 1756 he submitted 
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one for a fort called Santa Barbara. Another plan for a 
square fort, this one had a variation--the outside, or 
seaside polygon measured 105 varaa, being curved for 
greater cannon coverage. The plan showed in great detail 
the location of the stores, the powder rooms, kitchen, 
barracks, and other miscellaneous details. The powder 
rooms were located in the landfills of the bulwarks, which 
could present a dangerous situation because of fire 
hazard. This may have been too controversial for Aranda, 
for he rejected the plans once more.6 
Aranda rejected all of Diez' plans from 1746 through 
1756, and made no move to supply any new ones, until he 
finally drew up a set on December 15, 1756. It is possible 
that the Seven Years' War helped speed things up for the 
project, by showing the need for some defense along the 
Caribbean. Somodevilla had fallen from the king's grace by 
then, but Arriaga and the war secretary Sebastian de Eslava 
followed his policies very closely, at least immediately 
following his demise. The Council approved Aranda's set of 
plans in 1751, · and orders were sent to Arcos y Moreno to 
build according to them. A set of these plans arrived in 
Guatemala unsigned, but later designs point to Aranda as 
the author and designer. That communication or 
bureaucratic problems existed in the court can be seen in 
the explanation sent with the plans, stating that 
not having a profile or the land, nor knowing 
the altitude or the land in relation to the 
level of the sea, the author had not been able 
to fix a profile to his Plan1 this should be 
taken into account by the Engineer at the time 
of the Construction, elevating the Fort's floor 
several feet higher than that or the moat. The 
stores should be one foot higher than that of 
the Arms Plaza, to avoid too much humidity in 
the barracks: this same reason held true for a 
careful drainage or rainwater. These and other 
considerations were left to the prudence and 
intelligence7or the engineer in charge or the 
construction. 
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The drawings showed a triangular fort with a curved 
forward curtain. Apparently this, rather than the 
traditional square fort, had been proposed because or the 
lower cost involved, though the triangle could not be 
considered the best design. CristObal de Rojas, a military 
engineer under Felipe II and professor in the first. 
Academia de Portificaciones Espanolaa in Madrid, had 
written that the triangular design should be used only if 
no other design were possible. He believed the angles to 
be too sharp, which became a defect during any defense in a 
battle. If, however, the engineer insisted on building it, 
the front walls should be at least 600 feet long.a But 
these schools or military architecture did not usually 
prove to be right in America; conditions were simply not 
the same as in Spain. The Indians and the pirates did not 
follow the accepted methods for fighting a war, so the 
forts planned in Spain usually did not prove very 
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practical. As a result, they became Americanized, modified 
to create a oriollo style of fort architecture. 
The construction seriously interrupted the tranquility 
of Omoa, because of the large number of men involved. 
Workers travelled from as far away as Escuintla, San · 
Salvador, Gracias, Tenooa, San Pedro Sula, Yoro, and 
Tegucigalpa. By mid-1755 a list of the salaried workers 
included a 
Gabriel Franco, a commander 
Francisco Alvarez, engineer second class 
Jose Antonio Palma, a ship captain 
Father Jose Ximenez, a chaplain 
Pablo Garcia, ship lieutenant 
Jose Quintero, " " 
Mat:! as de 1 Sol, " " 
Jose Oroztiza, " " 
Juan Bautista Bayam, ship lieutenant 
Luis Guasco, mathematician and head foreman 
Jose Bermejo, war accountant 
Toaas Antonio de Amaya, shop ke~per 
Jeronimo de Ibarrueta, surgeon.9 
In 1756 D!ez moved the site of the fort away from the 
poor location planned originally to a much cleaner one, 
Nu n e z' "point 8 3 , " halfway bet ween the mangroves and the 
port. The plans for the low redoubt of El Real, built to 
protect the construction site, changed just as much as the 
plans for the fort proper. They once called for a shallow 
moat and simple counterscape, but no covered road. On the 
western curtain, one set of plans showed an extension to 
the dock, to be 150 varas long and 40 wide, with a circular 
battery at the end. This dock never came into being.10 
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Mediobaluarte Santo Cristo de Esquivias. 
Mediobaluarte de Santa B&rbara. 
Plaza de Armas San Francisco. 
Road to Puerto Caballes. 
Road to San Pedro Sula. 
Mediobaluarte San Gabriel. 
Mediobaluarte Pur!sima Concepci~n. 
Main Plaza "El Real." 
Main Gate. 
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D!ez received orders to use the blueprints drawn up by 
Aranda, instead of the many he and Alvarez had drawn. 
Expense apparently had changed the minds of the Council, 
and they approved the controversial triangular fort. 
Commenting on some of the detail of the new plans, Calderon 
Quijano mentions that the gun beds would be difficult to 
build, 
being with a reinforcement on the interior and 
exterior of brick and stone which they bring 
mixed with lime and is called micula, which for 
being scarce, it is necessary to take advantage 
of the brick, so that it will be a permanent 
wall with a lot of resistance .. 11 
On March 13, 1756, Alonzo de Arcos Moreno appointed 
Don Juan de la Rosa y Barba to the head foremanship of 
0 m o a , t h e f i r s t m o v e i n r e p 1 a o in g Di e z Navar r o • In a 
letter, Arcos stated that Diez had been at the site for 
over a year, accomplishing nothing except to spend money. 
Arcos divided Diez' engineering position between Gabriel 
Franco, Captain of Artillery, and Francisco Alvarez, 
Ordinary Engineer, and gave the military command to Rosa y 
Barba. D!ez moved to the cap~tal to work on the governor's 
pa.lace. 12 Arcos' letter is believed to have been written 
in anger or jealousy, for D!ez went on to become one of the 
lea.ding men in the Kingdom of Guatema.la.13 Fulgencio 
Garcia de Solis replaced Pa.nta.le6n Ibanez Cuevas as 
governor of Honduras, taking office on June 6. Jose 
Martinez then completed the move to replace nlez, receiving 
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the post or Lieutenant or the Royal Exchequer at Omoa. 
Drez, as mentioned above, returned to Guatemala. City. 
During the years 1757-1758 no orders were issued to 
actuall1 begin the construction, so the workers instead 
began searching for materials and continued to labor on El 
Real. These were, in effect, non-productive jobs, and 
Alvarez, like Diez, found himself accused of laziness for 
the la.ck of evidence or work being done. Alvarez spent 
pa.rt of his time drawing plans for a .fort, producing two: 
·• 
his "Plano del Puerto y Sitio de San Fernando de Omoa." of 
. 
Jun e 1 0 , 1 7 5 7 , s h. o w e d a.11 t he w o r k done t o d at e • E 1 R e a l 
had been built, though not as originally planned. The 
walls had been closed by October 18, 1756, and all the 
bulwarks scaled down to half-bulwarks, set in an irregular 
pattern to follow the contour of the land. Two bulwarks 
protected the north side--"Santo Cristo de Esquivias" and 
"Santa Mrba.ra"--and two the south--"San Gabriel" and 
"Purisima 9oncepci6n." El Real had a ca.pa.city for 60 
cannon, though only 26 twelve-, eighteen-, and twenty-four-
pounders po~nted toward the sea. and 6 four-pounders to the 
rear. The circular battery at the end of the dock remained 
strictl1 on paper, so its capacity for eight cannon meant 
nothing. The foreward curtain measured three varas thick, 
and the rest only one vara. The gun mounts had been lined 
to one half vara of thickness with brick, to ease any 
recoil damage.14 
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"Puerto de S.n Fernando de Omoa." 
The port of San Fernando de Omoa, 
situated on the coast of Honduras, at 
an altitude of 15°, 45 minutes from ,, 
the mouth of the gulf of Santo Tomas 
de Castilla. Seventeen castillian 
leagues. Luis Dfez Navarro. 
[Ascribed to Francisco Alvarado 
because of the shape of the fort.] 
Serv. Hist. Mil. Madrid; sign 5.171; 
P-b-11-10, hoja la, in Zapatero, p. 152. 
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Alvarez' second map merely showed the location of the 
redoubt on the coast. It did, however, point out a place 
for a torre6n, a small auxiliary fort to flank any ship 
entering the harbor, which he thought should be built on 
the outside point, detailed as "point G," probably N~fiez' 
point 83. That, in effect, started the idea for such an 
aid, for which several plans later materialized, though it, 
like the dock, never did. 15 Both of Alvarez' plans still 
showed a square fort, because apparently Aranda's plans for 
a triangular one had not arrived yet. 
In 1756 Arcos ordered the construction of a road, to 
replace the one closed through a misunderstanding several 
years earlier, which would connect the capital to the new 
fort. 16 Don Pedro Truco contracted to survey and mark the 
routes a road, in essence, consisted of a cleared-out path 
for mules, so making a road meant marking trees and rocks 
along the route. The Ayuntamiento of Guatemala agreed to 
bear the cost, and raised 17,000 pesos for the project--a 
sizeable sum for those times. After Truce's original 
survey, local corregimientos had to do a more careful 
clearing of the track, and maintain the right-of-way. At 
least two companies formed for this purpose, in Chiquimula, 
and in Comayagua. The new road, Arcos reported, would open 
new lands for the Kingdom, as it traversed very fertile 
areas of Honduras. The new population in these lands, in 
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turn, could maintain the road, in the long run paying for 
the initial cost in improved trade. 17 The total length of 
the road was 122 leaguea.18 
In June of 1757, Arcos reported to the Council the 
discovery of much-needed rook in three different areas. 
Rook, used in the foundations, had to be hauled in from 
great distances, being very scarce locally. It could be 
found, according to Arcos, in the port of Sal Chico, twelve 
leagues windward and at two other locations seventeen 
leagues the opposite way, leeward, in the Rro del Golfo and 
Santo Tomas del Castillo. Lime, used in making mortar, 
could be found just about anywhere. 19 On the eighth of 
October, 1758, Franco and Alvarez sent Arriaga a drawing of 
the completed temporary redoubt, which had been copied from 
one by Pietro Cataneo Senese, with the exception of one 
added bulwark. The interior of the redoubt had been 
christened Plaza de Armas San Francisoo. 20 
As a result of the rapid work of Don Juan de Fuentes 
Trillo, who rose to the post of Master Bricklayer on 
October 5, 1758,2 1 Alvarez reported finishing the 
foundations 0£ the main fort the following month, on 
November 12, and even sent plans showing what had been done 
since 1752. These plans were the first to show the 
triangular fort, but apparently had been drawn on an 
unofficial advance notice, being entitled "Projected 
plans"--the official order to build apparently had not yet 
6 J 
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"Plano del Fuerte" 
Plan of the fort that is being built for the protection of this 
port of San Fernando de Omoa on the coast of Honduras according 
to the condition in which today it is found. San Fernando de 
Omoa, and December 25 of 1774. Jph. Gonzalez Ferminor. This is 
a copy of the original. New Establishment, February 1, 1775. 
Navarro. AG!, Sevilla; sign. Mapas y Planos, Guatemala 149, 
in Zapatero, p. 157. 
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arrived! But when Aroos visited Omoa the rollowing March, 
he remarked that progress had been slow in the four years 
Alvarez had worked there, he could see almost no change. 
The great supplies of rock either did not exist or had not 
been exploited, for none at all had been stockpiled. 
Alvarez had no better relations with Arcos than D!ez had 
had ea.rlier1 the Captain-general asked Arriaga. to send a 
new engineer to replace Alvarez, whom he considered just as 
lazy as nrez. He appointed Captain-commander Jose Antonio 
Palma to replace Franco as military leader, in an effort to 
push Alvarez into accomplishing some work.22 
Official plans finally arrived on the 18th of September 
of 1759, and showed the projected fort in the desired 
location. Projected plans detailed the entire 
fortification system for the port, including the torrecSn on 
the outside point. 2 3 By December, Alvarez had finished 
halt of the foundations for the bulwarks, the rest of the 
groundwork ending the following September. Two months 
later the walls of the forward stories and rooms could be 
reported as done.2~ 
Death continued to plague the government in Guatemala. 
Mariscal del Campo D. Alonzo de Arcos y Moreno de la Orden 
de Santiago, who had taken over from Montaoz, died in 1760. 
His replacement, Fermndez de Heredia, had been promoted to 
Field Marshall statue when he moved up from the military 
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leadership or Nicaragua and Honduras. Fernandez eagerly 
pushed for the fort's completion, and requested a full 
report or the work done to that date. Joa~ Menz de 
Baamonte assumed the governorship or Honduras on June 25, 
1761, having been appointed the previous October 12. He 
replaced Interim Governor Franco, who had run the show 
after Fulgencio Garc!a Sol!s died. 2 5 
When Joa~ Antonio Palma took over the military 
leadership or Omoa, he passed on Fernandez' request for a 
full report to Alvarez. Alvarez had sevei-al plans drawn, 
one on a scale of eighty varas dated September 17, 1759, 
through December 31, 1760, and another dated September 18, 
1759, on a scale of 80 varas and a profile of 40 showing 
all the work done until then. He had two projected plans, 
one from July 1, 1760, on a scale of 80 varas and 40 or 
profile, the other from October 1, 1766, on the same scale. 
The last set had larger detail, the profile being done in 
25 varas, and dated September 18 through December 1, 
1760. 2 6 
One or · the most dynamic personalities on the staff at 
Omoa proved to be Captain-commander Palma. His biography 
is quite extensive, as his good points almost equalled his 
faults. He apparently arrived on the scene as a ship 
captain, and proceeded to purchase an hacienda at nearby 
Cuyamel. By the time he had risen to the military command, 
he ran a store, selling food to the workers at exhorbitant 
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prices. He began supplying himself with cheap or free 
labor by appointing recruits in the guards to "hacienda 
duty," as well as dipping into the civilian work force and 
slave pool quite liberall7. This caused man7 officials in 
Comayagua to complain to the Audiencia that Palma spent 
more time on hie ranch than at the work on the fort. 
A Royal edict on May 8, 1759 named him as one of many 
officers involved in smuggling with the British. Two years 
later, on September 30, 1761, three civilians lodged an 
official complaint, cosigned by four military captains, 
accusing Palma of requesting a militia of 50 men, and then 
using it only to work on his farm.27 'While a normal tour 
of duty at Omoa lasted only two months, many had spent more 
than six months at Cuyamel, without extra pay or even 
license to leave on a visit to their families.28 
The complaint requested the government to exonerate the 
militias from such misuse, as the men so used could not 
even visit their families, let alone feed them. Pay 
usually consisted of credit in Palma's store, where the 
merchandise sold at extremely high prices. Apparently the 
plaintiffs won their case, because Palma received his 
marching orders, along with a judgment to repay all men who 
worked at his ranch. Palma's ranch and slaves became Royal 
property, and he lost his position as commander at Omoa to 
Francisco Alvarez. At the same time, Juan de Fuentes 
Trillo we.a promoted from master bricklayer to 
foreman. 2 9 
65 
head 
Concern over the safety of the construction site arose 
when the British declared war on Spain on January 2, 1762. 
Serious trouble with the woodcutters in Belize erupted that 
year; the British occupied Havana on August 12, after a 
seventy-day fight with its populace; Mani la fell on 
October 6.30 Fernandez de Heredia wrote in an official 
report: 
I can do no less than bring to your 
consideration, to pass on to His Majesty, that 
if there is any breaking with the court of 
England, boats of competent strength should be 
sent to Omoa to defend the fort there. It is 
very undefended, and it is necessary to guard 
it to prevent any insults the English can do 
while it is in its present state. Even though, 
as the Engineers have pointed out, including 
Don Luis Diez Navarro's report, a small fort 
should be built on the point they call 
"outside", to defend the bay, it will be 
necessary to send at least one frigate of the 
squadron, with another from Havana. This will 
avoid illnesses and the ships can leave and 
refurnish with victuals and people. Orders 
should be given to this effect immediately.3 1 
This request would be difficult to comply with, as 
Spain had scarcely enough warships to defend existing forts 
in New Spain and Central America. England, on the other 
hand, had a large squadron at Jamaica purely for offensive 
purposes. Consequently the English moved from place to 
place, never losing in strength. As a solution, D!ez 
recommended halting the construction. Several advantages 
could be thus gainedz the existing foundations could be 
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tested by weathering, and materials could be replenished 
and stockpiled, and a new location could be studied for 
the placement of an anchoring shoe, as one or more of the 
existing ones had proved insufficient, due to the rockiness 
of the terrain. Evidently this recommendation went into 
effect, because the work stopped in 1763. The soldiers 
remained to protect the site, as can be seen in the account 
of the salaries paid in 1764.3 2 But by the time the orders 
to stop work arrived, the Peace of Paris, signed on 
February 10, 1763, had ended the war without mishap at 
Omoa. The first news of construction after the cessation 
came in November, 1764, when Diez passed by while working 
on the evacuation of the Rro Tinto area in compliance with 
article 17 of the Peace Pact: 
It was found necessary to resurface the 
foundation facing the sea, because the waves had 
eroded the protecting a.nchorag~ and threatened 
to undermine the construction.5j 
Alvarez had predicted such an event when he began to build 
according to the plans. 
In the same report, which included a set of plans 
showing all work already done, D!ez reported the discovery 
of a limestone deposit in the hill near the village, which 
could be used for making lime. The construction workers 
opened a quarry, thus eliminating the need to travel the 
seven or eight leagues to the ca.ya for mortar lime. Diez 
requested several repairs needed for the forts of 
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Inmaculada Concepc~n at San Juan, and at Golfo Dulcea "It 
is indispensable to maintain them, and to the repairs they 
need, new projects need to be added. 11 34 At about the ea.me 
time Heredia asked Arriaga to send a nev engineer to 
replace Alvarez, whom Arcos had fired when the convenient 
break the war provided came along. Alvarez apparently had 
died at the fort shortly after that.35 Diez, too old and 
weak, could not move back and resume the work there. 
A c c o rd i n g t o Zap at e r o , Infant r y Captain D. To ma s 
Hermenegildo de Arana, the Governor of Honduras, wrote an 
account of the history of Omoa, dated Hay 30, 1764.36 
Writing about the size of the fortification needed, Arana 
stated that the minimum guard should be of four companies 
of 100 men each--mulattos or mestizos of an area no more 
than 80 leagues from Omoa, so they would be used to the 
climate. Such men could be worth ten foreigners, who would 
succumb rapidly to the diseases of the area. Their 
families could also serve as spies for the fort, reporting 
any discrepancies through their kinsmen in the guard. 
Arana did not believe either the site chosen for the fort 
or the type of construction to be the best; it should have 
been built on top of the hill, where it could dominate the 
landscape. As it sat, the hill could be a detriment to its 
defense. Only a torre6n with a battery or cannon should 
have been put on the beachfront. But since this had not 
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"A chart of the Harbour and Port of St. Fernan.o de Omoa." 
1779-1780. Institute of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica. In Zapatero, 
p. 192. A note says that the outside walls were ten feet high, the 
garrison wall twenty-eight feet high and seventeen thick. The town 
was between the governor's house and the garrison. The structure 
to the right of the fort was a kiln, and the battery consisted only 
of a couple of trenches. 
-d 
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been done, the hill should be levelled and used as fill for 
the swamps in the immediate surroundings. Aranda 
expressed disappointment, "because the Fort that was being 
built, though the Plans say otherwise, is a badly-formed 
G a. r i t6 n " ( o u t p o st ) • 3 7 
Chapter Sixt The Labor Aspect 
Until recently, there ha.a been no solid evidence 
contradicting the idea that before the purchase of black 
slaves in 1755, only white labor had been used to build the 
fort. But Mario Argueta, in his article "Los Constructores 
del Castillo de San Fernando de Omoa 1759-1775," states 
that the work used Indian, Negro, and mestizo labor.1 Moat 
of the Indians used apparently came from Yoro and Tela, 
areas populated by Jicaque Indians. 2 As early as 1681, 
Francisco de Castro Ayala started the paperwork to move 
fifty Indians from each town within a forty-five league 
radius of Omoa to build the fort. Under orders from 
Sevilla, he also prepared to transfer fifty blacks to Omoa, 
as the fort had to be completed within five years.3 
Evidence 0£ official Indian labor usage still remains 
scarce, but indirect proof does exist. In 1770 a group of 
Indians complained about the cost of their trip to and from 
Omoa. They had not received as much pay as their ladino 
counterparts for the same distance traveled. The complaint 
stated that many had died because they had only been used 
to clean swamps and grow milpas (cornfields) and jiquilite 
(dyes) for the commander's own profit. The Indians held 
labor at Omoa in horror, mainly because of the distance · 
7 I 
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from their families, the climate, and the length or the 
required stay. Ji 
In 1762 Miguel Hidenze and Luis Manuel Rivera, 
residents of Tegucigalpa, complained to the governor that 
they could not operate their mines because the 
repartimiento (governmental division of Indian labor) to 
San Fernando de Omoa. virtually wiped out their labor 
force.5 That the repartimiento could seriously alter the 
operations of the mines can be questioned, though, because 
the Honduras mines did not use very much Indian labor.6 
Other complaints also prove Indian labor usage at Omoa: 
the inhabitants of Macholoa (in Ten-0oa) wrote that all 
their tribute payers had been sent to Omoa, and only 
returned to die, after having been paid half the salary 
agreed on. Jalapa, Salis.ca and Yams.la also sent Indians to 
the fort.7 In 1760 the Audiencia of Guatemala ordered the 
governor of Gracia.a not to send more Indians to Omoa, 
though the governor by-passed this order, using Indians as 
porters for bread or guns through Olanchito and Comayagua. 
The Audiencia's report mentions that in Piraera thirty 
Indians had died as a result or Omoa labor; seventeen died 
in Erandique, and twelve in Gualmoaca.8 That same year 
Luis D!ez Navarro wrote of the Indiana working on his 
project, clearly stating they only opened a road from Omoa 
to Quimistan, and did not work on the construction.9 The 
village of Nuestra Senora de la Candelaria, by the junction 
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of the rivers Chamelec6n and Choloma, disappeared 
completely, because its inhabitants all le.ft or died 
working on the construction of the fort, according to Jose 
Mar!a Tojeira. 10 
Argueta's article is the first to deal with the Indian 
labor in Omoa, and as such has several problems. Argueta 
states that after 1752-1753, African slaves or mestizos 
gradually replaced the Indians, but all the documents used 
to prove the existence of such labor, except for Governor 
Castro Ayala's orders in 1680, are from 1760 and later. 
Castro Ayala's orders were fifty years before any 
suggestion or, and sixty years before, any concrete plans 
for the fort at Omoa were made. Then Argueta mentions a 
petition in 1802 for payment for a group of twenty La Campa 
Indians who went to unload several ships that never showed 
up. They were not paid, even though two died en route. 11 
Because neither the Indians nor the Spaniards could 
cope very well with the climate of Omoa, the government 
purchased blaok slaves to deal with the heavy work of the 
construction. The exact figures and dates of the purchases 
are very confusing, if all the data is considered. Argueta 
dates the first purchase in 1771, with the payment of 
55,770 pesos for 217 blacks of both sexes. A 40,000 peso 
advance had been made to one Joseph Melchor de Ugalde, 
bonded by Juan Fermin de Ayoienena. When Melchor died, 
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Joseph Pifiol took up the account and received the remaining 
55,770 pesos. All three men belonged to the Consulado in 
Guatemala, and the price paid per slave followed the Real 
Compafiia del Asiento de Negros scale from Puerto Rioo1 260 
"pesos fuertes~ per black, 2~0 pesos ror mulecones (seven 
to ten year-olds from Africa), and 215 pesos for muleques 
(female mulecones).1 2 
That same year (1771) the Asiento de Negros de la 
Havana sent seventy blacks to Omoa, five being rejected as 
ill, and one dying en route. 13 Robert Hodgson and William 
Pitt also supplied blacks to the fort, with a contract for 
100 slaves. Their prices seem to have been somewhat better 
than those of the Asiento1 
140 pesos per slave, in lots or 50 men, 30 women, 
10 muleques, and 10 mulequas 
16~ pesos per slave, in lots or 100 men 
120 to 140 pesos for mulequesas only, depending 
on their size 
204 pesos for Gold Coast men 
196 pesos for Gold Coast mulecones 
170 to 190 pesos for Gold Coast muleconas. 1 ~ 
But Argueta's tally of the slave population differs1 
first contract slaves----~------204 caravalies 
(from Nigeria) 
second contract slaves----------232 mondongos 
(from Congo) 
third contract slaves----------- 98 caravalies 
fourth contract slaves---------- 57 caravalies 
owned by Palma-------------------23 
total ITT 15 
Harvey Meyer provides another set or figures. 
According to him, all the slaves had been purchased from 
Jasper Hall in Jamaica at 204 or 164 pesos per male 
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(depending on their condition) and 140 pesos per female. 
Hall charged 20 pesos for each deliver7. 16 The first 
purchase of 100 slaves on September 5, 1755, preceded 
another installment on November 2, 1767 or 100, as 
certified by Vicente Mart!nez, interim superintendant at 
the fort. In a letter signed b1 Arcos y Moreno on 
September 5, 1755, the officials involved emphasized their 
concern for that kind of dealing. If blacks had to be 
purchased, care must be taken that no smuggling take place 
in the prooesss a Spanish ship must be used, if available. 
Only the slaves could be transported, and no other item of 
trade allowed on board. 17 
Arcos y Moreno received a letter from Hall through 
Colonel Robert Hodgson on June 22, 1756, and the following 
day he told Phelipe Romano y Herrera, fiscal counselor, 
Juan Antonio Rodr!guez de Ribas, accountant, and Manuel de 
Llano, treasurer, to issue the payment and passports 
necessary to deliver the slaves and for the return of the 
ship. He approved a price of 184 pesos per slave, for 
blacks of good disposition, delivered in good health. Once 
again the officials issued a warning about the care to be 
exersized that nothing other than slaves arrive on the 
ship, and that the ship land only at Omoa.18 
The slavery at Omoa was a curious one, however. 
Normally slaves received a food and clothing ration and 
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were allowed to hire out after hours to supplement their 
income. At Omoa, they received cash to feed themselves, a 
cloth ration, money to make their clothes, and a tobacco 
ration. So to some extent they could be considered more as 
indentured servants than as slaves. 19 According to Rubio 
sanchez, slaves were given one peso and a tobacco or food 
ration.20 In 1758, the superintendant reported that the 
245 slaves belonging to the deposed military leader Palma 
had been apportioned off between Palma's estate (by then a 
royal hacienda) and the fort. 21 After the fort's 
completion, these slaves received their freedom, and formed 
the basis for the present day village of Omoa. 
D! e z ' pre d i c t i on t hat t h e £ or t w o u 1 d a t i m u 1 at e an 
increase in the population or the surrounding areas came 
true to a degree. Licenciado Domingo L6pez de Urr~jola, 
interim Captain-general, issued an order on January 16, 
1772, for the regularization of all new towns and poblados 
founded in the areas around Omoa.? 2 
The town or Omoa grew slowly: founded in 1752, it 
included the Royal Treasury building, a chapel, a hospital, 
a couple of stores and warehouses, the commandant's house, 
and barracks for the officers and enlisted men. Only 
people connected with the construction lived there, 
though. 2 3 Bancroft states the town "soon contained a 
considerable population, and became the outlet for the 
commerce or eastern Guatemala."24 An anonymous map drawn 
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"Plan of the Fort, Port, and town of Omoa. Omoa, the 17th of April 
of 1779. Agust:ln Crame." Serv. Geog. del Eje"rcito, Madrid; sign. 
lm-8a-2a-a 134, in Zapatero, p. 174. Note says the upper portion of 
the town was for blacks only. The lower portion only was called the 
town of Omoa. The plan shows Crarne's suggested batteries to increase 
the cannonfire of the fort. 
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in 1775 shows a town of 75 white families and a.bout ~00 
black slaves.25 Two years later, Joseph Ferminor reported 
to his superiors in Guatemala that the total number of 
inhabitants came to 1 ,3ll3t 1 ,029 blacks and 31Ji military 
personnel. In 1798 the Chaplain Juan de Pineda compiled a 
list of inhabitants that totaled 1,099. 2 6 By that time, 
Omoa. had a church, a police station, a hospital, a 
commandant's office, several ranch houses, a carpenter's 
shop, a blackemithy, and a small number or houses. 27 
D!ez Navarro drew up a set of plans in 1768, showing 
the position of the houses and other buildings of the 
village. 2 8 The plans are especially valuable for showing 
the location of the buildings inside of El Real. Outside 
the fort, the town consisted of a shop, the blacksmithy, 
the blaok slaves' quarters of the first and second 
purchases (they were kept separate), the lime and brick 
kilns, the cattle yards, the engineers' homes, the powder 
stores, and the guardhouses. Mentioning his orders of 
Maroh 25, 1757, which stated "The King orders the fort be 
made according to the original plan of the Conde de 
Aranda," Diez ma.de sure his plans fit the originals 
perfectly. 2 9 
Strict laws regulated life and conditions in the 
construction area and towns near forts. Were a fort 
separated by more than one league from the nearest city or 
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town, it had, by law, to have a priest with a salary of 130 
pesos per year, or at least equal to that of an ordinary 
soldier. Were the oonstruotion closer to tovn but lasting 
longer than a week, the governor should provide for the 
holy sacraments for his workers.30 Work could not last 
longer than eight hours in a single day, though this could 
be arranged to fit the desires of the head engineer. He 
could, for instance, leave out the hottest part of the day 
by working from five a.m. to one p.m.31 Every Saturday 
work had to stop one hour early so the paymaster could 
attend to distributing the salaries of the workers. Food 
had to be provided, though not necessarily for free. The 
head engineer did all the hiring and firing, and the 
Captain-general set the wages, after consulting with the 
head engineer and his accurate records of eaoh worker's 
ability.3 2 Zamora provides the following pay scale used in 
Guatemala, though he does not make it olear how long the 
pay period was: 
in 1717, infantry in the Guardia de Palacio-----8pesos 
mounted Gua.rds----------------------~-15 
in 1750, a Commandante de Campo----------------30 
an alferez (quartermaster)------------25 
a sergent--~-------------~------------15 
a corporal----------------------------12 
a footsoldier-------------------------8pesoa.33 
in 1768, a lieutenant--------------------------~8 
an alf8rez~-----------~-------------~-38 
a standardbearer----------------------34 
troops (footsoldiers)----------------- 8 
mounted soldiers----------------------15 
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These salaries did not have · to be earned, however. 
Anyone with the right connections and the right price could 
arrange for a career in the armed foroee. The sale or 
military rank was a common practice, and the price paid 
depended on the position sought and the ability of the 
purchaser to pay. In general, a lieutenant-colonelship 
oost 800 pesos1 a captaino7, 201 a lieutenantship, 18; a 
quartermaster's post, 15 pesos.34 
Other laws governing the defense system called for all 
fort blueprints had to be submitted to the Council of the 
Indies first, with a sheet of specifications, 
circumstances, forms, and reasons for the building.35 The 
engineers had to personally lay out plans and lines, and 
the Captain-generals to assist in the construction, seeing 
the construction to a completion as quickly as possible. 
Workers could not hire out for any other job until 
discharged by the fort adminiatration.36 
Every building in the near vicinity of a fort had to be 
demolished and the owners reimbursed by the Real Hacienda. 
No one could make drawings of Spanish forts except by 
special permiseion.37 All ships in the harbor had to 
salute the fort with a small mortar upon arriving, and if 
they failed to do so, would be immediately attacked.38 The 
king forbade foreigners to enter into any Spanish 
fortification system.39 
Chapter Sevens The Second Construction Period 
In his report to Arriaga, Salazar recommended a small 
torre6n on the northwest point of the beach, where D!ez had 
origin a 11 y p 1 an n e d t o bu i l d t he fort. The t or r e6 n sh o u 1 d 
have twelve and eighteen pound cannon, and would flank any 
ships entering the harbor. Apparently Arriaga forwarded 
the recommendation, seconded by Diez and the engineer 
Antonio Murga, to General Cermeno, Director of Engineers in 
Spain. The latter returned the plans because the copy he 
received did not include topography or a plan to house 
troops, necessary if the torre6n were more than 1,000 varas 
from the fort. He considered the torrecSn far too weak for 
an7 defense against assault by land, but as a device 
against naval aggression, it might be a very good idea. 
D!ez' report to Arriaga in 1768 showed the point where the 
torre6n should be been built. His plans presented a 
profile and elevation for the project on a scale of 30 
vars.a, plans quite adequate for a good idea of the area, 
despite Cermeiio's opinion to the contrary. 1 Cermeno drew 
up a version of a torroon as one possible for Omoa in 1769: 
a complete tort, reduced in size, but capable of acting 
independently, despite its being subject to San Fernando.2 
Even though the construction of one or these small forts 
did receive approval and funding, it was never built, and 
never again did it attract attention.3 
8] 
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Murga rapidly caught on to the causes of the delays in 
the construction of the fort, he could see the time lapse 
between a request and an approval and the delivery of 
materials. He drew up a plan and map or all that had been 
built at the time he took over, and sent it to Guatemala on 
the 22nd or February, 1768.4 The following year he 
proposed altering the plans or the fort, placing the main 
entrance at the rear or southeast side, instead of the sea 
or northeast side, in an effort to avoid entrapment by a 
besieging army. The typical bulwarked system called for 
two gates& a main one, and one called "del Socorro," or of 
succor. The original plans for Omoa had one main door on 
the seaside and an auxiliary aide door on the southeast 
side. All traffic to San Pedro Sula had to march around 
the fort before entering, a circumstance which could prove 
fatal in case of a siege, as reinforcements most likely 
would come from that direction. Therefore Murga proposed 
re-making the auxiliary door as the main one, and opening 
another auxiliary door on the third side, the one closest 
to the San Pedro road. That way no door opened on the 
battle side of the fort, and one faced each exit route from 
the fort. Drez approved the plan; the new door was opened 
in the area previously housing the chapel, so the chapel 
was then moved to the opposite side, where the main door 
had been. Arriaga, upon hearing of the change, expressed 
the great appreciation the king had for all the efforts to 
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make it the best defense in the area.5 But he included a 
note of concern £or the health of the men at the site: 
Nonetheless we notify you of the King's 
resolution concerning the engineers available 
for duty at Omoa: a rotation system should be 
set up, using trained personnel used to the 
climate, taking turns as foreman to relieve the 
directing Engineer, thus to prevent any 
detriment 6 to the health of the Europeans in that port. 
Toward the end of 1769 a rash of diseases hit Omoa very 
hard, and the Audiencia requested the Council of the Indies 
to send six military engineers to serve on rotation at 
Omoa, and a surgeon to help the ill. 
Though an attempt had been made to stop troop movements 
and rotation of militia duty to Omoa, some militias still 
had to serve there. In 1777 Captain Alfonso Mercadillo 
took two companies from Golfo Dulce to Omoa: they marched 
half of the trip to Bodegas, then sailed the rest of the 
way. 7 They had little to serve with, though Garcia Pelaez 
included in his Memorias a list of what he considered the 
inadequate armaments at Omoa,8 The fact that the personnel 
at the fort did not meet adequate standards either can be 
seen in a report written on December 1, 1769: 
as far as the help, it is reduced to asking for 
five helpers of the artillery; four subaltern 
officers of the cavalry; two engineers, one a 
chief and the other a subaltern; two 
sergeants, four corpora.ls of artillery and 
twenty artillery men, practical all, of 
cultivated customs, whose number is considered 
necessary for the action seen in Omoa, or other 
forts in the Kingdom, which are needed to 
defend adequately Spain's intereats.9 
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The new captain-general, Pedro Salazar, wrote in 1771 
that ordinary engineer Captain Lorenzo Alvarado had died, 
and Extraordinary engineer Lieutenant Joa~ Gonz,lez 
Ferminor had fallen ill, as well as Juan Dastie, of the 
same rank. The only engineer who remained in a condition 
to work was Jos~ Alejandro.10 Draftsman Joa~ de Medula 
died, and Murga joined the ranks of the ill, though he 
recovered and returned to Omoa to work on the circular 
curtain and storehouses. By the end of 1772 Murga had 
succeeded in advancing the construction to the point of 
closing all the walls. The northeast side and the three 
bulwarks fast neared completion also. 
Because of the change of the main entrance, another 
delay occurred. No notice of approval had arrived by 
August of 1772 for the change, though the order had been 
sent on the 28th of March of that year. Several openings 
had been left in the walls, in case the Council disapproved 
of the changes, and to .facilitate the construction by 
allowing workers to carry materials in from several 
different work areas outside the fort. These openings 
appeared on the plans Murga drew up on August 28, 1772. 11 
They provided an interesting sidelight to the current 
knowledge of the forts traces of filling-in or these 
access openings gave rise to rumors of the existence of 
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torture chambers. In later stages of the fort's history it 
was used as a prison, during which time these "torture 
chambers" supposedly came into use. There is nothing to 
prove or disprove these rumors, of course, but the drawings 
of the openings on a map as access gates should lead one to 
disbelieve them. 12 
Salazar died on May 5, 1771, and the Audienoia named 
Juan Gonzalez Bustillo as his interim replacement. The 
next year work finally recommenced officially after the 
1763 war break. Arcos 1 Moreno took over from Gonzalez 
temporarily, and gave the orders to begin building again. 
That year Jose Gonzalez Ferminor became chief engineer, 
replacing Murga, who left for Spain in 1773. 
The July 29, 1773, earthquake that destroyed Guatemala 
and forced the moving of the capital to its present site 
did not much affect the work at the fort. Diez reported 
the request by Joaqufn del Castillo, the fort accountant, 
to expand the size of his office spaoe.13 The new Captain-
general, Capitan de Reales Guardia.a Espanolas y Mariscal 
del Campo de los Real es Ejeroi tos Don Mart!n de Mayorga, de 
l a 0 rd e n d e A 1 can t a r a , s e n t 3 0 , 0 0 0 p e s o s t o £ in i s h the 
construction. He requested a complete report or anything 
needed, but Ferminor, too sick to answer, did not comply 
immediately. He did eventually draw up a set of plans 
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showing just what had been done up until the time of his 
takeover. 14 
On January 25, 177~, the Council asked to see plans 
showing the advancement of the construction at Omoa, in 
order to start planning for outfitting the garrison, 
sending the artillery, and other supplies. Because of bad 
times with the court of England, they feared war again, a 
fear that came true in 1779. The Council worried about the 
slowness of the construction, and about the quality of the 
personnel at the fort. In a letter to Arriaga dated 
December 20, 1774, D. Silvestre Abarca lists all of the 
engineers assigned to work on the Omoa project: 
Engineering Director 
Second Engineer 
Second Engineer 
Ordinary Engineer 
Extraordinary Engineer 
Extraordinary Engineer 
Extraordinary Engineer 
Luis Diez Navarro 
Lieut. Col. Joaquin Casaviella 
(who never arrived from Spain, 
and was replaced by Lieut. Col. 
Antonio Sampere) 
Lieut. Col. Antonio Marin 
Captain Sim6n Desnaux 
Lieut. Juan Dastie 
Lieut. Jose Gonz~lez Ferminor 
Jose Alejandro. 1 
A new set of plans drawn on February 1, 1775, showed 
the advances in the construction: the main door had not 
been finished, but Ferminor (the senior engineer at the 
fort) had completed the officers' and troops' quarters, the 
Castellano's apartments, two stores on the left of the main 
door, and fifteen shops on the circular curtain. A room 
left in the south bulwark, marked as:/f"8 on the map, had 
been designated as a powder room.16 Commenting on the 
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"Plan and profile of the Fort of San Fernando de Omoa. Omoa, the 
17th of April of 1779. Agust!n Crame. This is a copy made by 
Julio Albo y Helguero." Serv. Geog. del Ejercito, Madrid; sign. 
LM-9a-la-a 134, in Zapatero, p. 177. The legend reads: 
A principal door 
B door of El Socorro 
C shops 
D chapel 
N powder room 
F circular battery 
G low batteries to increase firepower 
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location of the powder room, Zapatero statesz 
the 8th store, adjacent to the interior angle 
of the first wall or the southern bulwark, is 
disposed toward the powder room, thus showing 
the dados on the ventilation shafts opening 
onto the arms plaza--and one with the shaft 
curiously open at the same angle as the wall, 
an irregularity which we esteem very 
adventuresome and dangerous, because in the 
case or a siege, an incendiary bomb could cause 
an explosion in the roomr indisputably this is 
a techni1,l deficiency which we can not readily 
explain. 
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According to Ferminor's 1775 plans, the shop with the 
auxiliary door (on the San Pedro Sula side) shared space 
with the chapel. Just outside the southern bulwark, at 
"point O," a lime kiln had been opened. Because of this, 
for some time the southern bulwark was nicknamed "the one 
of the kiln," even though the kiln had been filled in 
shortly after its construction. Ferminor also made a five-
note explanation on his planes 
1 • a 11 sh op s had been fin i s h e d "c on e 1 c a n6 n a 
tree rosoas" 
2. the fort now rose to the level of the 
majeaterial cord, ready to begin the work 
on the parapets 
3. the map showed how much or the counterscape 
had been finished, and that all of the foundation 
had been done 
4. the eastern bulwark, r/f20 on the map, had been 
completed, and already had two guardhouses 
finished 
5. the southern bulwark,:/t.21 on the map, was half 
completed. its 
Mayorga wrote a letter to Arriaga in 1773, stating that 
"this work is found now in the state to mount the 
artillery • • • • "1 9 The next year Mayorga wrote to Joe~ 
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Galvez, who had replaced Arriaga as Secretary or the 
Indies, that two more engineers should be sent to Omoa, not 
counting Ferminor--and noted the arrival at the capital or 
Sim6n Desnaux, a captain or engineers. Then on the sixth 
or January, 1775, he communicated to the court that he had 
sent the engineer to examine and inform me or 
what is necessary for the defense of the plazas 
he requested thirty-three cannon and gun 
carriages and other various utensils. In the 
very probable event that the enemy bring 
mortars, it is necessary to have in the fort at 
least eight mortars and the corresponding bombs. 
There should be at least 1100 men in the garris~8 
and two artillery companies or fifty men each. 
The last official notice mentioning the construction of 
the fort came with another letter from Mayorga to Galvez in 
1775: 
With the date of April the last I am informed 
by the commandant of Omoa that he has mounted 
on the wall £acing the sea of the castle six 
cannon or brass of twenty-four pounds and two 
culverins of twelve, and that at the end or 
the same month he will have it with all its 
artillery and placed on a regular defense 
schedule; that in all the present month they 
will conclude the landfills or the two 
collateral bulwarks.2 1 
Mayorga projected a total completion date of June, 1778. 
The bulk of the construction had been done, but the bulwark 
fill-in had nots carts and drivers would have to be hired 
for that job. 
In January, 1775, Antonio sanchez went to Omoa to 
replace interim military commander Francisco Aybar. 
Ferminor, head engineer still, felt the Royal Hacienda 
9 I 
could afford to buy carts for the slaves to use on the 
landfills. Several others disagreed, feeling that slaves 
could do the job by hand, with baskets, probably. The 
argument went on for years. 22 The landfills apparently 
rose to a workable degree by Christmas, 1777, though an 
anonymous map from early 1775 shows the work to have been 
completed much as the fort stands today. The counterscape 
had no landfills, but the upper esplanades had been 
completed on all three sides. The stores had been finished 
de a tree roscas,, (see note 18) and covered as bomb 
shelters. 2 3 Ferminor, in 1777, wrote of incomplete 
parapets, and of the work needed on the landfills. 
Mayorga assured Galvez that these two details would be 
completed as soon as possible. In the meantime, six 24-
pound cannon adorned the front wall, along with two 12-
"caliber" culebrinas. 2 4 
The following year Diez Navarro sent two engineers, 
Sim6n Desnaux and Juan Dasti~, to survey the. fort and 
report on its condition. An uneasy Audienoia worried over 
the problems with the British in Belize, and thus for the 
safety of the fort. The engineers reported some serious 
deviations from Aranda"s original construction planes the 
parapets had been altered slightly, though this did not 
present any problems. But the builders had substituted 
mortar for dirt fill-in over the shops, which might prove 
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troublesome; the foundations were weak to begin with, 
having been built over sand without any deep foundations or 
anchorings. Several walls already sported cracks, 
especially along the front curtain, where the sea had 
eroded the exposed bases and foundations. But the fort 
could withstand a continued cannonade: Desnaux had all 
eleven brass cannon (of twenty-four, eighteen, and sixteen 
pounds) fired simultaneously without ca.using any ill 
effect. The over-reliance on brick instead of rock in the 
outer walls meant another serious deviation from the 
blueprints. Brick could not withstand enemy cannonballs as 
well as rock could, so the engineers did not feel the fort 
could stand up under a sustained artillery attack. 
Besides, sea water and constant humidity tended to soften 
brick and melt the adobe, which had a high salt content to 
begin with. Three arches over lengths of brick constituted 
the structure of the stores, built one over another without 
alternating, a practice which weakened the fort's basic 
structure. Both Daatie and Desnaux only gave approval to 
the structure because they knew of no alternative except to 
tear down the fort and begin again from the foundations. 
At the time of the report the landfills had not been 
even started, because no dirt suitable for such use had 
been found in the immediate area. Looking at the bright 
side, however, they believed the topography in some way 
compensated for some of the fort's weaknesses, if only 
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beoause of the lack of another decent landing place nearby. 
The shops remained irremediably damp and humidz all but 
three collected water at alarming rates, though the 
engineers felt this could be fixed, at some cost to the 
crown. The mangroves had reclaimed muoh of the previously 
cleared areas, a fact not considered good either for the 
defense or for the health of the inhabitants. The roads to 
San Pedro Sula and Guatemala also remained in a very sad 
condition, probably through simple lack of use. Desnaux 
estimated the cost of repairing the eighty-one league route 
to Guatemala through San Pedro Sula to be 418,450 pesos. 2 5 
Brigadier de Infanter!a e Ingenier!a Mili tar D. Agust!n 
Crame, appointed by the Council of the Indies as inspector 
general of the fortifications of the Americas, produced 
another evaluation of San Fernando de Omoa.26 At the time 
of the report (April of 1779), only two companies guarded 
Omoa, with an effective strength of 100 menz Crame 
accurately admitted the garrison's deficiency in case of 
attack that months his assessment was to be proven true 
only five months later. 
The construction needed serious ref .ormsi the 
northeast curtain did not have enough cannon coverage, and 
Face Two of the northern bulwark and Face One or the 
southern could not withstand any attacks. One solution 
might be, Crame suggested, to build two separate batteries, 
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connected to Se.n Fernando by "oaponeras" (literally, 
cloaks), opening toward the sea. This would complement the 
defense of these weak spots, and add greatl1 to the 
firepower of the fort. Were the redoubt of El Real torn 
down, the oost of building these two batteries would only 
amount to a.bout 6,ooo pesos. The interior of the fort 
needed more "aljibe," provisioning of food e.nd water. A 
deeper well should be dug inside the plaza, to improve the 
water supply for the number of troops and animals quartered 
within the fort. 2 7 
The garrison, Crame continued, needed reinforcing 
desperately. It had barely 100 men, and certainly not 
enough officers& Lieutenant Diego Duran had gone to Spain, 
Captain Jose Cuf!llar and under-lieutenants Antonio Antonoti 
and Gabino Martrnez to Guatemala. Only tvo officers other 
than the oastellano held commands under-lieutenants Manuel 
C l er i a c and J o s tS M en~ n de z • Guatemala could not supply 
reinf~rcements readily, being too far from the fort, so 
Crame suggested stationing a contingent of 400 veteran 
troops in San Pedro Sula, of which 100 could remain in the 
hills near the fort. Omoa. should have 400 veteran troops, 
including sixty artillerymen, and a reserve of 100 slaves 
as reinforcements. Current infantry consisted of only 
seventy-four veterans and six Spanish corpora.ls. The 
artillery personnel included forty black slaves with no 
real training, and their weaponry he termed "loose"s they 
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only had twenty-six cannon (brass, or twenty-four and 
twelve pounds), of which six needed repairs already. or 
the inven tor1 of forty-three iron cannon (24, 18, 12, 8, 4, 
3, 2, and 1 pounders), twenty had not arrived, and ten of 
the remaining had broken down. The men needed 14,755 
bullets to bring current stock up to adequate standards, 
because only 5,945 of all calibers filled their stock. 
Instead of 400 "sixteen caliber" muskets with ba1onets, 
the1 had onl1 50. Supplies of lead, flints, and compounds 
for making powder simply did not exist. 28 
Ironically, in 1777, the Captain-general had tried to 
stop the conscription of militias for rotation at Omoa, or 
at least to stop them from going to the fort. Because news 
travelled slowly, this did not go into effect for some 
time: Comayagua still sent eighty men per month on a 
regular basia.29 
Chapter Eights The Commercial Aspect 
Commerce, after defense the most important reason for 
the fort's construction, grew very slowly. During the 
first few years, only Royal traffic used the ports troop 
shipments, supplies, and an occasional Register ship. Jose 
de Palma arrived in 1755 in the first merchant ship to call 
at Omoa, but only because a storm did not permit him to 
land at Matina. 1 The first merchant ship licensed to the 
port arrived the following year--the Maria under Captain 
Silvestre Martinez de Ca.noba.s, from Santo Domingo. 2 
Commerce tended to be a serious problem for the whole 
of Guatemala. Part of the trouble started when a treasurer 
in Peru lowered the gold content of coins being minted, for 
his own profit. Guatemala appears to have borne the brunt 
of this flood of counterfeit coins, and suffered 
economically from it. Then Ecuadoran cacao flooded the 
Mexican market, practically eliminating all Guatemalan 
competition. A worse blow came in 1620 when the King 
prohibited trade with Peru; the loss of commerce with 
Havana. in 1676 proved to be the last straw. Batres 
Jauregui sums it up well by quoting the "cha.pin" 
(Guatemalan) adage "Buen principio de semana. tiene el que 
lo ahorca.n en lunes"--you start off a week well when you're 
hanged on Monday.3 
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The Peru trade had been goods Guatemala sent tar and 
dyes and cacao in return for wine, vinegar, rum, almonds 
and olives. With the lose 0£ these imports the price of 
wine skyrocketed, if only because 0£ demand. The ban 
opened the way for blatant smuggling betveen Nicaragua and 
Peru, because only Nicaragua supplied Peru with pitch for 
its wine casks, and only through Guatemala could Peru 
benefit directly from the Manila Galleons.4 
Taxation hit Guatemalan merchants very hard. In 1629, 
Spain demanded 4,000 ducats 0£ gold annually to support the 
military. The Windward Navy was established during the War 
of Succession, adding 
4 reales gold on each box 0£ indigo 
2 reales gold on each load of cacao 
2 reales gold on each arroba of grana silvestre 
1 real gold on each hide 
1 real gold on each petac~ (measure) of tar, 
tobacco, or sarsaparilla 
to the current taxess the e;obela~, tequios, diezmos, 
4 
primicias, alca.bala.s, the quint~ on metals, derechos, 
oficios vendibles, and other local fees. These all 
amounted to near bankruptcy for Guatemalan merchants by the 
end of the seventeenth century.5 
The yearly Cadiz fleet sent at least one ship to 
Honduras, under the protection of the W'indward Navy, 
bringing wine, velvet and jewelry, and returning to Spain 
with cacao, indigo, balsams, and woods. But on the 12th or 
April of 1633, the king dropped the naval protection of the 
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Honduras squadron, forcing the merchants to send their 
wares through Veracruz. With the development of the 
Ecuadoran cacao production, Guatemala lost its monopol1 on 
that market and had to diversify its productss planters 
tried cotton, sugarcane, tobacco, pitch, and alquitr6n. 
The area around Trujillo produced maize, fruits, grapes, 
oranges, lemons, and the rivers abounded with fish. Cattle 
also multiplied rapidly, and in later years Thomas Gage 
reported important crops of hides, Canna Fistula, 
sarsaparilla and yucca.6 The production of jiquilite, 
cochineal and vanilla declined, though precious woods and 
mineral wealth increased. But the destruction of the 
seaports by pirates after the loss of protection by the 
Windward Navy hurt all commercial traffic drastically. 
According to Rubio &tnchez, the merchants' future 
looked so bad that 
the commercial movement during the year 1702 in 
Central America can be said to have been 
circumscribed in the arrival of the· ship named 
"Magdalena," from Panama, which arrived at th~ 
port of Realejo. 7 
In 1742 Guatemala imported 400,000 pesos of merchandise 
from Spain and 200,000 from China. That same year it 
exported 300,000 in gold and silver, 250 1 000 in cacao and 
dyes, and 50,000 in miscellaneous items, thus producing a. 
trade balance of zero.a 
The commercial outlook in the colonies brightened 
somewhat by 1765, with the opening of several Spanish ports 
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to the Caribbean trade. The new Bourbon king saw these 
free trade reforms as the only way to restore agriculture 
and industry in the colonies to their previous vigor. 
Before these improvements, Guatemala had shown very low tax 
profits1 in 1757, it sent only 29,000 pesos to Spain, with 
a mere 22,000 remaining to the merchants as profit. After 
the trade reforms, in 1768, 150,000 pesos remained to the 
merchants, and by 1769, 175,000 pesos. In 1778, the corte 
de caja (the government's share) in Guatemala jumped to 
218,000 pesoa.9 
Still, only thirty or thirty-five mercantile houses 
controlled all the commerce in the Kingdom or Guatemala. 
The Peru trade reopened, consisting of two or three ships 
yearly bringing wine, olive oil, and table articles worth 
200,000 to 300,000 pesos in exchange for indigo. Cuba 
averaged eight to ten vessels, exchanging rum and onions 
worth 5,000 to 6,000 pesos per shipment, for indigo and 
3,000 to 4,000 pesos in gold and silver coin and bullion. 10 
Mayorga wrote in 1773 of over 2 million gold pesos' worth 
of indigo being exported yearlya the Ungo, Viteri, Laucel, 
Calera, ~jera, and Batres families controlled most of it. 
In 1787 the fleet took to Spain 5,677 arrobas or 
cochinilla, producing revenues of 283,750 in gold pesos.1 1 
Troy Floyd has written an analysis of the merchant 
class of Guatemala and the monopoly it ran within the 
JOO 
Kingdom. 12 There appears to have been a coalition of 
peninsulares and criollos, an elite group interrelated by 
marriage, compadrazgo, and business ties, who took 
advantage 0£ their position at the right times. The 
textile revolution in Europe demanded indigo, and the 
Spanish merchant marine had been growing as the pirates 
lost their control of the shipping lanes. In the last 
quarter of the 18th century, Central America produced over 
25 million pounds of indigo: adding this to the silver 
mined in Honduras, the income a.mounted to about 2 million 
pesos yearly. But many farmers complained against the 
Consulado, the elite monopoly, insisting it stifled them by 
dictating the prices of their crops. As a result, the 
government passed laws attempting to "free" the "inner 
provinces" (Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador) from the 
Guatemalan merchants. 
The construction 0£ the fort at Omoa began this 
movement of reform, by symbolizing a freedom at least for 
Hondurass farmers theoretically did not have to ship their 
indigo to Guatemala. The fort's proximity to the Mota.gua. 
River meant Salvadoran farmers could ship their wares on 
that river to the new port. Honduras again "benefitted" 
with the opening of Trujillo to trade with Spain in 1782, 
and N i c a rag u a w i t h t h e R:! o S a. n J u an 1 n 1 7 9 6 • Th e . Bou r b on s 
reduced all taxes in 1781, specifically for Omoa and 
Trujillo, and in 1782, the alcabala (tax) for importation 
101 
was lowered from four to two percent. Two 7eare later the 
council abolished the alcabala altogether. Hone of these 
tax reforms produced any significant change in commercial 
patterns for one simple reasons the monopol7 owned all the 
transportation. The farmers had no one to sell to but to 
the Consulado in Guatemala. Their only other option was to 
buy ships and transport their own crops directly to Spain, 
an option none or them could afford. 
Two more laws were passed in an effort to help the 
farmers. Captain General Galvez ordered all trade from 
Guatemala to go through Omoa, and the trade from El 
Salvador through Zacapa to Omoa. But these also failed for 
the same reason. To the merchant monopoly, even though 
taxes dropped, the move to Omoa meant a net increase in 
expenditures. The port of Santo Tonr!s proved to be the orux 
of the problem1 because of pirate attacks, the tax 
collectorship there had been abandoned. Thus, when the 
merchants shipped through Santo Tomis, they paid no taxes. 
The lowering of tax percentages at Omoa and Trujillo only 
placed them on the same level as Santo Tomas, and since the 
transportation and roads to that port had been well 
established and used for many years, they remained cheaper 
to use. The elite had close ties with Cadiz, and saw no 
reason to change their smooth-running .operation to other 
cities in Spain, either. 
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Thus between 1789 and 1793, of twenty-four ships that 
landed at Omoa and Santo Tonas, twenty-one belonged to the 
Cadiz merchants, and landed at the latter port. That may 
be why the members or the Consulado opposed building a fort 
at Omoai 
Let us say lastly, that one or the things that 
slowed down the fortification of the coast of 
the North Sea was the resistance put up by the 
rich and priviledged merchants or the capital 
of the Kingdom, with the interest of exerting a 
more complete control, let us say monopoly, 
over commerce, and to defend their contraband 
with the same English, which so much profited 
them. Very clearly the king is told by the 
Royal Officials of Comayagua, W·hen they 
informed him by letter on December 3 or 1746 
that the influential men of the city of 
Guatemala were opposed to the fortification of 
Trujillo, so that there should be only one 
port, a dock, not a fort, to re~3ster the ships 
of commerce on the Golfo Dulce. 
The distinction between external and internal trade in 
Guatemala also proved a purely artificial one. The indigo 
buyers controlled most other internal products alsos they 
would buy up cacao, cotton, threads, cloth, iron, cattle, 
and hides, and trade in kind for the indigo crops. By also 
owning the banks, the Coneulado members provided most of 
the currency for the regions they yearly advanced about 
one million pesos to the indigo farmers, and purchased 
about 50,000 head or cattle yearly for barter. In short, 
the consulado ran a true monopoly on all trade in the 
Kingdom of Guatemala.14 
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Britain ran a strong, if illegal, competition to the 
Spanish merchants. Clarence Haring wrote that two 
circumstances helped this illegal trade: the length of the 
coastlines Spain had to defend, and tolerance by Spanish 
officials toward the contraband. Central America simply 
did not have enough inhabitants to afford adequate 
surveillance. Because of this and the strict trade 
regulations, even government officials participated in the 
illegal trade, often olaiming--quite truthfully--that the 
colonists demanded and needed it. 15 The problem became so 
extensive that the Audiencia began an intensive study in 
1758 to find out the exact extent of this smuggling, 
particularly in Honduras and the Moskitia. 16 This study 
produced the report that indicted even the commandant of 
Omoa, Jose Antonio Palma. 
But the Spanish merchants not only had to face British 
competition: they labored under Spain's mercantilist 
theories that dictated which ports could or could not be 
used, and what went through them. Because at first Central 
America had no port of entry, all trade to and from 
Guatemala had to go through Veracruz in New Spain, and 
overland through Oaxaca. In an attempt to overcome this, 
the Consulado in Guatemala called a Cabildo abierto, a town 
council, and asked the President or the Audiencia to open 
Omoa as a port of entry. Doing so would reinstate the 
protection of the Windward Navy, under which they wanted to 
104 
ship their indigo to Spain or to Havana. The president 
acquiesced, but Don Domingo de Nicheo, a representative of 
five trading houses in Spain, voiced opposition. Only the 
king, he claimed, could take such a course of action. As 
a result, the president sent an official request to the 
king on the fifth of December, 1758. His arguments noted 
the distances the wares had to travel: 260 leagues to 
Oa.:xaca, another 80 to Veracruz, and only during February 
and March did the weather permit the four-month trip to 
Oaxaca . . From there to Veracruz took another 45 to 50 
days. Thieves and bandits added to the cost and difficulty 
of the trip, as did accidents caused by bad road 
conditions. 
In all, the president concluded, reaching Veracruz in 
time for the Register ship proved difficult, and storage 
was very expensive if the wares did not arrive on time. By 
contra.et, the trip to Bodegas covered only 80 leagues, and 
from there to Omoa was another 120 leaguesz a new road had 
been opened at a cost of 16,089 pesos, facilitating 
communication with the new port. If the king approved the 
trade with Havana, a 150 ton ship would suffice to carry 
all the trade at first, and would be very beneficial to 
trade and commerce for the whole kingdom of Guatemala. It 
would increase the diversification and volume of trade, and 
thus the revenues to the king's ooffera.17 
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The request took three years to procesez on the 5th or 
January, 1761, the Council announced an order, originally 
written on March 5, 1760, approving free commerce between 
Omoa and Spain, through Havana. 18 Eut though approved, the 
new route took some time to develop. Three years later, 
the cacao export had almost disappeared, though indigo and 
xiquilite (superior unprocessed indigo} had increased some. 
Commerce with New Spain increased dramaticallyz possibly 
as a result or this the king issued a Royal Edict on 
January 17, 1764, lifting the ban on trade with Peru and 
New Granada. A dramatic increase in trade did not mean 
much, though. The port or Omoa in 1764 saw only two major 
export shipmentss the taranta Jesus, Joe~ y Mar{a under 
4 
Jose Retortillo arrived from O:Cdiz and returned with gold, 
silver, and other products, and El Vigilante under Captain 
Cosme Joaquin Therreros took the same type or load. Royal 
ships still stopped at Omoa regularly, supplying the fort 
and workers with materials and roodsturrs.19 
From then until 1775 ship movement at Omoa gradually 
increased. · After 1775 it almost stopped, possibly because 
ot the war in the Caribbean. Rubio sanohez believes the 
use of the port seemed low because of the lack 0£ knowledge 
concerning it. Commerce increased slowly with time, as 
knowledge 0£ the port spread.20 
The king finally decided in 1765 that only free 
protected trade could revive the sagging agricultural 
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economies in the colonies. A Royal Edict on October 16 of 
that year opened several new ports or entry in Spain. The 
results proved positive, and the trend spread, opening more 
ports in the colonies. Omoa prospered as welli by 177~ it 
had need or a group of port pilots, headed by Jose Antonio 
Martinez. Commerce diversified also, as the captain-
generals in the mid-1700's had encouraged production or new 
grains with moderate success, and the production of tobacco 
spread to Istepec, Chinameca, Copan, and Le6n, Nicaragua. 
The Audiencia commissioned another road to San Pedro Sula 
in 1780, which Juan Pinto and Francisco Fortani signed a 
contract to build. 21 
Chapter Ninei Cost and Value 
Construction at Omoa officially ended in 1775. 
King's minister Zemn de Somodevilla's military policies of 
aggressive belligerence against the British in Belize had 
taken their toll on the speed or construction by diverting 
funds, dividing the military strength, and not really 
accomplishing much of anything. The sluggish movement 
finally ground to a halt, exhausted economically by 
Somodevilla's efforts to do too much at one time. 
British forces had great admiration for the fort, 
without seeming overly concerned with it. They considered 
its location an· excellent harbor, and "the fortress at Omoa 
should have been exceedingly strong, if strength were 
always the consequence of labour and expense." 1 A 
description written in the Annual Register mentions walls 
28 feet high surrounded by a deep dry ditch, with parapets 
18 feet thick1 the entire structure had been made of solid 
stone raised, the authors claimed, from the sea 20 leagues 
away. "Its batteries shewed about 40 pieces of artillery; 
but it seemed to have been deficient in that respect, as 
well as in point of garrison."2 
So perhaps Salvatierra is correct in assumming that 
although Omoa did not serve much of an active role in the 
defense of the Kingdom of Guatemala, it had somewhat of a 
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deterrent effect, by letting the British know that Spain 
intended to make good its claim to the north coast of 
Central America. 
This fort and that of La Inmaculada of the 
river San Juan came to be the formidable 
obstacles where was wrecked, conquered, the 
English pretention to take over the now called 
Central American Isthmua.3 
Omoa may not have been as strong a deterrent as 
Salvatierra opines, but the possibility exists that the 
Spaniards knew of Oliver Cromwell's great plans for the 
area. The Spaniards then made their presence known just 
enough to foil these plans, or to intimidate Cromwell's 
counsellors into believing that the Western Design would 
not be the easy pushover Cromwell thought. The same could 
be said to have happened to later English monarchs. 
The cost of the fort had been staggering to the 
Spanish Crown. At t he end of 1 7 6 1 , Fe r nan d e z gave a 
detailed account of the expenses incurred to June 22 of 
that years 875,147 pesos, 6 reales, not counting the loans 
from Campeche, Comayagua, Havana, Chiquimula, and Zacapa. 
Guatemala had also used up the credit of 40,964 pesos, 5 
r ea l e s , and 7 mar av e d{ a 1 o an e d t o Ca m p e ch e t o a up po r t 
Melchor de Navarrete on an expedition against the British 
in Valis (Belize).4 The town of Sonsonate sent an expense 
report fora 
February 6, 1760---130 pesos for salary and trip 
April 15, 1761-----192 pesos for rice 
J J 0 
60 
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November 22, 1763--325 
pesos for its transport to Saoapa 
pesos from Sacapa to Golfo 
pesos for 32 quintales, 
one arroba, 19 pounds of Ja.rcia. de 
Xenique 
May 4, 1766--------200 pesos for rice 
____ 5_4 ___ p_e_s_o_s for its transportation 
total 1,043 pesos. 
Thi s bi 11 was s i g n e d by And re s G u e r r a in June , 1 7 6 8 • 5 
Francisco Xavier de Requena signed a report of accounts 
rendered by the Royal ·Coffers to the fortification project 
for salaries, mail, recruitment, and recruits, for the 
dates January 28, 1752, through May, 1768: 
1752---------------66,-61. 6. 22 2/3 
1753-~-------------51,235. 6. 17 
1754--------------158,540. o. 11 (includes 29,871. 2 1/2 
' spent on a Balis t:Belize J expedition) 
1755---------------55,222. 2. 17 
1756---------------95,463. 6. 17 
1757---------------95,162. 6. 17 
1758---------------63,484. 5. 0 
1759--------------148,552. 6. 0 
1760---------------73,004. 7. 0 
1761---------------75,370. 2. 1 
1762---------------51,131. 4. 6 1/2 
1763---------------34,531. 4. 22 1/2 
1764---------------56,541. 5. 0 
1765---------------55,534. 6. 0 
1766---------------38,160. 7. 5 2/3 
1767---------------56,163. 5. 0 
1768---------------34,089. 2. 0 (Jangary to May 21) 
total 1,199,282. 3. 1 1/3 
Comayagua submitted a separate cost sheet, for the period 
between June 2, 1752 and July 25, 1768, signed by Manuel 
Lopes de Rajo y Soto: 
1752---------------50,000. o (April 1~) 
1753-~--~---------------o. o 
1755----------------1,641. 0 
1756----------------9,082. 0 
1756 (sic.J---------3,311. 4 
1759 tsic ·J---------5, 524. 0 
1759----------------5,052. 6 
1760----------------5,434. 4 
1761-----------------,855. 6 
1762----------------1,903. 4 
1763------------------330. 0 
1764-7--~-~-----------~-o. o 
1768------------------214. 0 7 CJuly 25) total 83,349. 0 
l l l 
Calder6n Quijano provides a different set of figures, 
signed by Armiz y Madas 
Note on the quantities that have been spent from 
the Royal Coffers in our charge, for the 
assistance of the port of San Fernando de Omoa, 
since the 27th of January of 1752, when the 
expenses began, until the 20th of July of 1773. 
On the salaries of officials, 
employees, and recruits----------- 39,515. 5. 1/2 
on money remitted-----------------995,806. s. 0 
on food and transportation fees---435,718. 3. 1/2 
on purchase of negros------------- 55,760. O. 0 
on various equipment, 
and transportation fees-----------121,360. 5. 0 
on various minor expenses------- 4,632. 4. 1/2 8 total----------1,~52,763. 7. 1/2 
Though construction had been stopped in 1764 because 
of the war, the garrison had remained to protect the site. 
An expense breakdown for that year shows the cost in pesos 
of supporting the garrisons 
January---------2,102. 
February--------1,993. 
March-----------2,078. 
April-----------1,868. 
May-------------1,580. 
June------------1,668. 
July------------1,762. 
August----------1,752. 
September-------1,680. 
October---------1,846. 
November--------1,718. 
December--------1,753. 
1 
1 
7 
4 
4 
7 
2 
2 
5. 1 /2 
6. 1/2. 
i•9112. 
1 I Ji 
1/4 
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Salazar reported that by 1766; at the beginning of his 
rule, 1,117,690 pesos and 7 reales had been spent, and only 
the foundations could be seen. By July, 1766, Murga had 
spent another 129, 331 pesos putting up the walls and 
several arches. Clearing the swamps raised the cost 
also. 10 A typical construction monthly expense sheet might 
look like this one signed by Joseph Pussilla: 
August 1767 
Infantry and artillery------------480. 1.2 
Volunteers------------------------306. 6 
Civilian workers------------------127. 6 
Monthly salaries officers -------129. 6 
Plaza Mayor materials -----------250. 6. 11/13 
total 7,288. 6. 2/3 1 1 
Salazar, in an effort to cut the cost of reeding the 
workers, gave orders to restock, at royal expense, the 
Royal Hacienda at Cuyamel, by then confiscated from Palma. 
He required the corregimientos of Comayagua and Chiquimula 
to help supply food. He also sent a request to the king 
that all supply ships arriving at the fort be exempt from 
taxes for a period or ten years, in the hope or attracting 
more merchants. The king agreed, but only for a five-year 
period. The Cuyamel project the king vetoed, and asked 
Salazar to enact measures insuring prompt pay for the 
militias at the fort.12 
Business did pick up somewhat during the construction 
period. Merchants not connected with the fort paid 10,438 
pesos in taxes in 1766, on 2,609 1/2 zurronea of dye loaded 
onto the ships Jesds Mar!a l Josep~ and Santa B!rbara, 
under Captains Pedro Barcelo and Joseph de Urristti. 13 
] ] 3 
B7 1777 the cost of the construction had gone down 
drastically, as had, of course, the amount of work being 
done. That year a bill submitted by Dona Caeilda Araoa for 
the work of land fills requested payment fora 
May--------1036 loada-------------777 pesos 
June-------1044 loads-------------783 pesos 
July------- 938 loads-------------703 pesos 
August-------8~3~2,,__l_o_a_d_s __ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-~-~---_-_6~2_4,,_.;-p __ e_s_o_s 
total 3,850 loads D 887 pesos 1 4 
An estimate of the cost to finish the project came to 
179,240.4.8 pesosz 
To unload and fix the shops---------9,639 pesos 
To reload and finish the shops------1,408 
To finish the parapets, and stairs-- 82. 2 
To finish the counterscape----------3,112 
To resurface the parapets and 
covered road-------4,024 
Excavation to fix the stores--------1,344 
To finish the bulwarks--------------1,596 
To refill the parapets--------------1,870. 2. 17 
landfille--------------------------98,035. 1. 05 15 total 179,240. 4. 08 
In 1806 the price of labor exceeded 19,000 pesos 
yearly. As this labor meant black slaves, the government 
felt something had to be done to cut the cost. Most slaves 
did not work at the f ort--they filled in as personal 
servants to the military officers, whose political power 
had grown too strong to be bucked. The solution to the 
problem came in 1811 with the emancipation of the slaves, 
though these had to remain on their allotted lands. 16 
] ] 4 
Batres Jauregui puts the cost of maintenance for the fort 
after the construction at 60,000 pesos yearly. 17 
During the construction period, the secretary of the 
Indies, Arriaga, recognized that the fort might have been a 
white elephant after all. It had taken over sixteen years 
to build, earning a reputation as a graveyard for bodies 
and money, and yet its purpose as a defensive fort came to 
be questioned seriously: 
This port, elected as the most useful to the 
commerce of that Kingdom and having begun to 
establish and fortify 16 years ago, has been a 
sepulcher of peoples, and much more of. monies. 
It has been the successive special charge given 
to Presedents Vasquez Prego, Moreno and 
Heredia, but the work has advanced little. Its 
fortification cannot count with more than 
receiving the respect of corsairs and one or 
two other ships which might attempt to insult 
it; but when exposed to being beaten by an 
enemy squadron, it could be of very little use 
except as far as has been mentioned1 but in 
any case, as a more adaptable and safe port for 
the commerce of the province, and the only one 
which should remain, it is best that you do 
your utmost t°a see to the conclusion of the 
project begun. 1 
General opinion held that the fort could not withstand 
a serious attack by an enemy because it was too small. Its 
only value could be for commerce, because of the good bay: 
the fort provided a sense of security that merchants liked. 
Arriaga thus held the opinion that as passive defense the 
fort became useless. Either he did not know or he 
overlooked the original intention of the project as a base 
for an aggressive defense of the coast. Spain could no 
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longer arrord to outfit the large numbers of ships required 
to implement n!ez' system, or even to stock large defensive 
forts. So Arriaga used the poor planning as an excuse to 
justify the apparent failure to build an adequate fort at 
Omoas perhaps, he surmised, some use could be salvaged by 
using it to defend a small commercial port. In the short 
ten years between the beginning of construction and 
Arriaga's letter, the purpose of the tort had changed 
completely from the aggressive warfare school of thought to 
the passive defense theory. 
Architecturally and technically speaking, the fort 
remains hard to categorize. Zapatero notes that its design 
by Aranda anticipated by twenty years the development of 
the triangle style of fort by Montalembert, for it was 
simultaneous with the teachings or the school at ~zieres, 
which influenced all military design in Italy, Spain, 
Germany and Sweden. But he points out that three of the 
leading military architects disapproved of a triangle as 
the basic plan for a fort. Crist6bal Rojas, professor at 
the Escuela Militar de Fortiticacion Ofensiva y De£ensiva, 
arte de Fuegos y de Esouadronar, wrote that the triangle 
plan should only be used as a last resort1 J. Cassani of 
the same institution said the same thing in 17041 and 
Pedro de Luouze, director of the Real Academia de 
Matemticas in Barcelona, wrote in 1772 that a triangular 
I I 6 
fort could withstand a siege just as long as any other, and 
for a much lower cost, though he preferred other styles. 19 
Zapatero does give an attempt to classify Omoa, by its 
different attributesz 
The fort, according to the norms or the art or 
fortification, is the followings Defensive, by 
its disposition from few to many1 composite, 
by being composed of natural and artificial; 
irregular, by the disproportion or the capital 
radius or bulwarks 1 and 3; comfortable, by 
its conditions and mediums1 advantageous, by 
dominating the field; useful or of consequence 
by being the key to the defense and 
communication to the Valley of Sula and the 
Royal Road to Guatemala; horizontal, because 
all the rooms are on the same level; by its 
domination, large; and remote, by the number or 
o an n on a2n d r e a c h o f o v e r 1 , JJ 0 0 v a r a s o f Castille. O 
Zamora notes that San Fernando did not have the 
appearance of a feudal castle nor the conditions of a 
modern fort. The bulwark system predominated in the 
1700'e, having been introduced during the time of the Duke 
of Alva, from Italy, where Paociotti, the father of modern 
fortification, had adopted it. 21 
On the sixth of September, 1771, President of the 
Audiencia Bernardo Troncoso del Rinc6n ordered engineer 
Antonio Porta y Costas to make a survey and report of 
conditions at Omoa. The latter submitted the required 
report on April 30, 1792. 22 
The fort's position was 15 degrees, 4 minutes 9 
seconds North, and 287 degrees, 14 minutes longitude from 
the Tenerife Meridian, with an elevation of no more than 
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two feet above sea level. The hot, humid weather became 
unhealthy when the sea breezes blew over the swamps in the 
winter. The bay itsel.r seemed good, protected completely 
on the first and second quadrants, and part of the thirdz 
its bottom was loam, with white sandy beaches. An effort 
should be made to check the slow and continuous silting up 
effect o.r the Omoa River by planting trees and shrubs 
around it and dropping rocks a.t the river's mouth. 
Landmarks near the fort included Puerto Caballos, three 
leagues eastward; the Chameleoon River with a draught of 
six feet, seven leagues eastward; the Ulua River, with a 
draught of seven feet, nine leagues eastward. The road to 
San Pedro Sula remained very dangerous, as travellers 
could easily be ambushed by the British at the Chameleoon 
crossing. 
The structure of the fort followed that of a 
"Hornaveque Doble" or crown, with thirty-one rooms for 
barracks, stores, magazines, chapel and dungeons. The moat 
had a counterecape, but the walls lacked all the parapets, 
having only an exterior "revestimiento" (coating of 
plaster). Some 0£ the curtains had been finished already. 
The circular part needed stairs, and all the landfills, 
including that of the covered road, remained incomplete. 
The arms plaza, 
finished, either. 
parapets, and esplanades had not been 
A hill 800 varas away, 32 1/2 varas high 
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and 280 in circumference dominated the forti the town on 
the lee side of the hill had been built away from the only 
healthy breezes available. Despite the silting action of 
the river, the entire bay still remained deep, a 
characteristic of the entire Caribbean between the Ulua and 
Motagua ri vere. 
In critiquing the structure, Porta noted the 
undefended appearance of the two wings and all the 6olas 
and circulars. They had no flanking points, a defect that 
facilitated an enemy scaling assault. The redoubt of El 
Real had fallen into disrepair and did not have sufficient 
strength to defend itself. Because of this, it also could 
be used as a cover by an attacking force, thus forming a 
serious defect in the defensive system. The outer walls of 
the fort appeared strong, but the interior needed 
improvement because of the lack or adequate drainages rain 
seeped from the ramparts into the stores and barracks, 
melting the lime mortar. For this reason Porta expressed 
doubts that the interior walls could last more than a 
couple of years, and hoped they could be rebuilt. Another 
major problem with the drainage also concerned the stores, 
for they were built one foot lower than the plaza. floor, 
and subsequently flooded with frightening regularity. 
In its present condition, Porta concluded, the fort 
could not be defended, and the long-term projects to repair 
it should be started as soon as possible. The seaside 
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bulwarks needed to be enlarged or added to, as mentioned 
earlier. The road to San Pedro Sula seemed to have been 
the only operating one, and Porta recommended it be 
abandoned in favor of the unfinished road started in 1778. 
The new one proved susceptible to attack, as shown by the 
British in 1781. His estimate to complete the construction 
and repairs came to 179,2110 pesos and 4 realea, plus 
another 63,791 pesos to build two half bulwarks to 
complement and enhance the defensive posture of the site. 2 3 
Porta gave one final recommendation: he found the 
port of Santo Torma a much more suitable port of entry, if 
a canal could be built to the Motagua River. This done, 
freight could be unloaded from the ships and onto 
riverboats which could then travel upstream to San Pedro 
Sula, eliminating some of the danger posed by bandits and 
pirates on the Omoa route. Porta therefore stated that the 
fort at Omoa should be abandoned and the garrison 
transferred to Santo Tomas. The cost might be heavy to 
begin with, but the long-range savings would be very much 
worth the trouble. Omoa, he pointed out, could not and did 
not stop banditry along the Che.meleoon or Ulua rivers. He 
also pointed out that a more thorough survey of the area 
should be taken before following up on his report.24 
Thie report seems typical of the attitude many 
Spaniards held concerning the defense of the Caribbean: 
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forts should be built with land protection in mind. But 
Omoa's use as a fort against land expeditions only came 
about because of the indecisive policies of the 
administrators in the government of Guatemala and Spain. 
Constant bickering between the two schools of thought 
concerning colonial defense hurt the strength of the 
system, as did the conflicts of ambitions, ideologies, and 
court factions. 2 5 
The result of all this bickering was predictable--a 
poorly constructed San Fernando de Omoa. Its plane, though 
excellent, had been poorly executedz 
The Fort at San Fernando is of terrible 
construction for the elementary reason that it 
was condemned, by its basic concept, to be so. 
With heroic stubborness, the Spanish builders 
took upon themselves to follow a structure of 
heavy and elephantine ideology and execution, 
against all 2 tnconveniences and insolvable limitations. 
Telles contends in his technical assessment of the 
fort that Spain's technology at the time did not have the 
ability to create a floor elastic enough to not break under . 
the strain of the climatic and temperature changes, and yet 
strong enough to hold up the amount of fill-in required by 
the plans. Spain, in essence, built a fort beyond its 
ability to do so. They could not make the fill-in 
waterproof enough, so the high humidity and rainfall of the 
area made the wails crack under both the enormous weight 
and the erosive action of the water. The engineers used 
12 J 
brick made locally o! inferior clay with a high organic 
matter content. The salt and minerals in the clay 
dissolved when it rained, causing the brick to decompose 
£aster than the lime mortar used to bold them together. 
The !ill-in areas, because of the absorbing characteristics 
of the dirt and sand used, became basically a large water 
tank, which dripped and poured water through cracks almost 
constantly. The humidity in the stores made their use 
almost impossible.27 
The economic maintenance of Spanish forts was the 
responsibility of the local authorities. A tax on 
agricultural and manufactured commerce had to be paid in 
Comayagua, which would then be sent on to Omoa and 
Trujillo. A proposal called on the Audiencia to route all 
ores from the mines in Honduras through the two fortified 
ports. If enacted, this traffic could then be taxed to 
maintain both the forts and the roads used by the ore 
ca.rts. 28 
The port and fort of Omoa created an unusual political 
situation. As a military plaza, it came under the direct 
supervision of the Captain-general--but it also had its own 
political government, municipal and other officers, 
customs-houses, royal treasury, and a delegate to the 
consulado in Guatemala. The Captain-general had more than 
just military and customs jurisdiction over Omoa, when 
compared to other forts in Central America, because of its 
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port or entry status. Omoa bordered on the Corregimiento 
0£ Chiquimula, and therefore £ell under the government 0£ 
Comayagua. But Comayagua only held jurisdiotion over 
matters conoerning the taxation of merchandioe to and £rom 
Honduras, because Omoa. controlled its own commerce, being 
the main port 0£ entry £or Guatemala City. 
As far as the line 0£ authority went, the Captain-
general of the kingdom had £inal say over military matters. 
He held the responsibility for all armed £oroes on land and 
sea., named all the military assistants in the government, 
and appointed all other military ministers (quartermasters, 
treasurers, eto.). 2 9 All the kingdom's forts fell under 
his direct supervision as pa.rt of the defense of the areas 
Omoa, San Juan de Ulda, Trujillo, Gol£o Dulce, Hatina, etc. 
When the Audiencia separated the jurisdiction 0£ the ports 
from the torts, the latter remained in the same line of 
a.uthorityz thus the town or Omoa became the concern or 
Comayagua, but the fort remained under the command of the 
Captain-general, while the port or commerce held its own 
authority, under the Audiencia..30 
Chapter Tena Loss and Recovery 
In May, 1779, Captain-general Matias de Galvez 
appointed Sim6n de Desnaux, a rorty-year-old Lieutenant-
Colonel of Engineers, as military commander of Omoa. Galvez 
expressed a serious concern ror the fort's safety because 
of the recent outbreak or hostilities with England. He 
recognized the serious tactical errors made in the 
construction of the fort, and feared an attack, if only 
because of the closeness of the Balis (Belize) enemy camps. 
He visited Omoa, leaving Guatemala on the seventh of 
September. On the sixth of August Galvez noted the 
completion of the new road between the capital and Omoa, 
and the clearing of the mangroves and swamps enough to 
render the place livable. As a result, he recommended the 
official court mail route be through Omoa, rather than 
through Veracruz. 1 
The following September 21st, Desnaux took up his 
command at Omoa, and recognized immediately the intent of 
the British to take the fort by foroe.2 Three days later 
he reported having recognized four enemy ships on the 
horizon at ten in the morning. Knowing the poor state of 
the fort's defense provisions, he put one small cannon on 
board a Spanish ship in the harbor and requested all 
available gunpowder be sent to the fort immediately. The 
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enemy ships entered the harbor flying Spanish flags--a 
popular pirate trick--but Desna.ux fired at them. The 
British returned fire, damaging the walls of the fort 
slightlya at sunset the British raised their proper 
colors. Apparently landing just outside the bay at 
midnight, the pirates attempted to do some bartering with 
Spanish merchants for dyes. They then put out to sea on 
the morning of the 26th, leaving behind one frigate damaged 
in the fra.ca.s.3 
Desnaux immediately sent Galvez a request for 
reinforcements and war materiel, as his current stock had 
dropped to dangerously low levels. He needed money also: 
because of backpay problems, Desnaux felt little confidence 
in his men, who showed little interest in doing their jobs. 
A company of Spaniards, 100 to 600 men strong, had 
earlier pressed an attack on the settlement at St. George's 
Cay, in an attempt to send the ba.ymen there packing. The 
Governor · of Jamaica answered by sending Captain Dalrymple, 
the commander of a new force of Irish troops, to St. 
George's relief. Admiral Sir Peter Parker also sent a 
squadrons the frigates Charon, Lowestaffe 1 and the Pomona, 
a.long with the schooner Race Horse, all under the command 
of Captain Luttrell. They had orders to intercept, i£ 
possible, several Register ships in the area.4 This and 
similar types of hostilities ca.used war to break out once 
more: the hostile conduct of the English despite the 
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treaty of 1763, united to other causes, made Spain declare 
war again on England.5 
Luttrell and Dalrymple joined forces for the second 
attack on Omoa the following Octobers on the sixteenth, 
Desnaux sighted more enemy sails on the horizon. Twelve 
vessels in all showed up--two frigates, a ship, a paquebot, 
a brigantine, two other armed boats, and five vessels not 
described. The guns of the fort disabled one ship and ran 
another aground, whereupon the attack temporarily ceased. 
Desnaux issued an order threatening to execute anyone who 
did not show up for general quarters. Forty-five thousand 
pesos in the cashier's box he removed to safety, probably 
into the fort, but possibly he sent them to San Pedro Sula, 
to remove them from danger altogether. On the following 
day, the seventeenth, the British landed at Puerto Caballos 
and marched across to Omoa. 
According to the Annual Register, 1780, the British 
forces numbered about five hundred, under the leadership of 
naval captains Parkenham, Nugent, and Parker, and Captain 
Carden of the 60th of Engineers.6 After a small skirmish 
with a group of negros, they took the hill near the town. 
Zamora claims Desnaux and his lieutenants Juan nastier and 
Juan Ant on i o Mart! n e z did not keep an ad e qua t e w at oh , and 
neither did the rest of the 230 men in the fort.7 Joa~ 
Rodr!guez expresses the same opinion.a 
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Desnaux ordered artillery fire, but the cannon mounts 
still had not been completed, so the cannon could not be 
aimed very accurately. He moved several cannon from the 
Spanish ships in the harbor to the fort, for the lack of a 
decent number or artillery there. Then another problem 
arose--not enough men had the training to work the cannon. 
The British ships returned into the bay, exchanging several 
shots with the fort. Desnaux mentions the outstanding 
bravery or several artillery officers: nastier, ~rrandiz, 
Toll, and Tom~. After setting fire to the town, the 
British footsoldiers and zambos began pressing their 
attack seriously. Because the torroon recommended by Murga 
and nrez had not been built, Luttrell found it easy to trap 
the Spanish ships in the harbor. By evening, the ill-
trained soldiers in the fort had only 300 kegs of old 
gunpowder left. They could only wait for defeat or 
reinforcements from Guatemala. 
The next day, the eighteenth, Desnaux moved several 
small cannon to the rear walls, but could only afford to 
fire one shot every quarter of an hour. Commander Juan 
Daatier went on a reconnaisance patrol, and reported that 
the counterscape, unfinished and without a landfill, 
provided an excellent shelter for the British, becoming a 
hindrance to the · defense. On the nineteenth, officers 
Clerec and Men~ndez tried twice to remove the British 
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infantrymen, but failed because they lacked proper cannon 
coverage. 
Desnaux reported that on the 20th he had to force all 
the black artillerymen out or the barracks to man their 
cannon. That day the British forces began their assault on 
the south bulwark, then moved to the north side, where they 
forced the Puerta del Socorro and scaled the walla.9 
Another account holds that on the 19th, the Spaniards ran 
out of powder, whereupon Bene Huelhe with 1,000 men scaled 
the counterscape on the west wall, built two varas lower 
than the parapets. They entered the moat and scaled the 
walls with, according to Mencos Fajardo, ladders owned by 
the fort but carelessly left outside. Rubio S!nchez quotes 
Desnaux' report that approximately 2,500 invaders took the 
entire garrison captive.10 
Zamora puts the time or the attack at 4:30 a.m., and 
mentions no resistance by the Spaniards other than one 
cannon fired by officer Men~ndez which killed one 
Portuguese mercenary. Under-Lieutenant Clerac prevented 
Sergeant Thome from firing two cannon with shot at the 
British after they entered the £ort.11 The Annual Register 
presents a different story: after a cannonade since three 
that morning, 150 men with ladders approached the fort 
without being seen till they crossed the ditch. Several 
ladders broke under the cannonfire, but eventually two 
seamen mounted the walls and held the Spanish defenders, 
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Map showing troop and ship positions during the battle. Copy of 
an original by Joseph Antonio Martfnez, sent to the Council by 
Joseph Gregorio Rivera in February of 1780. AGI Sevilla, sign. 
Mapas y Planas, Guatemala 241, in Zapatero, p. 189. 
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overoome by surprise, at gunpoint until the rest of the 
invaders olimbed up. The Spanish fled over the walls, and 
hid in the casementa.12 
that 
Bancroft tells the story in yet another way, stating 
a better rate might have attended them the 
t.spaniardsJ had not some of the negro 
artillerymen and a company of regulars, 
dismayed by the odds against them, turned 
recreant and broken down with their axes the 
gates of the fortress. 13 
The number or captives taken varies acoording to the 
souroei Mancos reports 400 prisoners and 100 men, 
including Desnaux, escaping. The Annual Register lists 355 
rank and file, plus officers and townspeople taken. 1 4 At 
the official surrender, the Governor and prinoipal officers 
handed over their swords and keys, yielding to their 
captors the fort, the garrison, and the Register ships that 
had earlier eluded Admiral Parker's orders for their 
capture. 
After some negotiations, the captives marched out 
free, in return for the release of several British men from 
Cayo Cocia.n. The Church plate and ornaments from the 
chapel Huelhe held as deposit, to ensure compliance with 
his commands. The British took merchandise from the 
Register ships valued at over three million, either pesos 
or pieoes-of-eight. Garo!a Pel~ez says Desnaux left his 
second in command and two chaplains as hostagea. 15 Desnaux 
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did offer a ransom £or the 250 quintales or quicksilver; 
but Huelhe declined the offer, as the loss of the mercury 
could hinder Guatemala much more than the ransom might help 
the British. A similar offer of ransom for the fort he 
also turned down, leaving a small garrison to guard it. 
There is some debate concerning the retaking of the 
fort by Spanish forces. Domingo Juarros and Andres Calvo 
state that the British garrison had evacuated Omoa by the 
time Matias de Galvez arrived there to lay aiege. 16 But 
Garcia Pelaez, Bancroft, and Modesto Lafuente wrote of a 
vicious fight for the reconquest. 17 
R o b e r t o R iv as , t he go v e r no r of Y u ca tan , h ad j u s t 
repulsed a British contingent from his province, and, 
hearing of the disaster at Omoa, headed that way. The 
account varies, but apparently he arrived too late, though 
his ships managed to chase down the Leviathan, which had 
foundered with all the money taken at Omoa. 18 Bancroft 
records the story otherwise: the ship with the treasure 
foundered and sank in a storm, and the rest of the British 
ships barely managed to escape. Apparently the ship Rivas 
captured had on board some Spanish prisoners or war, which 
Huelhe had sent away from the scene so they could not be a 
hindrance to him or a help to his foes. 19 
When Matiaz de Galvez heard of the fall of Omoa, he 
raised an army, forced loans from the merchants of 
J 3 I 
Guatemala, and sent out requests for aid and support. The 
Viceroy in New Spain sent 500,000 pesos and troops through 
Oaxaca. Galvez' itinerary took him through Chiquimula, 
Copan, and San Joa~, where he waited £or several days. 
Comayagua sent a contingent under Anzoategui, and San 
Salvador sent an army under Colonel Manuel Francisco 
Panigo. Galvez arrived at Quesaila on the 31st or 
October. The Comayagua troops had arrived early--on the 
23rd--and encountered many black slaves and escapees from 
Omoa. Galvez armed 99 or these with machetes and lances, 
and waited for the 238 reinforcements from Guatemala. On 
the 9th of November he received 150 rifles, ~6 quintales of 
bullets, 3 trabucos (blunderbusses), 106 pairs of pistols, 
55 shotguns, and a large quantity of powder and flints. 20 
By November 18, Galvez had arrived at San Pedro Sula. 
Pardons were given to prisoners in San Salvador, San 
Vicente, San Miguel, and Sonsonate, on the condition that 
they join his army. Zamora claims Galvez warned the 
Viceroy or New Spain, who sent Roberto Rivas with an army 
from Yucatan. The latter arrived too late for any action 
other than to capture the shipload of prisoners Bene Huelhe 
had sent to Lake Izabal. Huelhe had done this so Galvez 
could not count on them to help in the force to retake the 
fort. 21 
On the 23rd or November, Galvez and his army left San 
Pedro Sula. After camping at Choloma, they arrived the 
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next day at Rancho Ojo de Agua, two leagues from San 
Fernando de Omoa. On the 25th, he took the heights around 
the fort and the river, to prevent the British from 
restocking or retreating. A report or the Spanish army 
states they had 230 rifles, 2 quintals of powder, and 3 
quintales or bullets, to be spread among the following 
troops1 
Batall6n de Infanter!a 
Squadron or Dragoons 
militias 
prisoners or "exiles" 
blacks, slaves 
totals 
troops 
50 
91 
296 
80 
60 
577 
officers 
ii 
8 
22 
311 22 
A group of blacks went to def end the river and 
beachfront. The prisoners dug trenohes to within 100 paces 
of the British front lines. Twelve grenadiers of the 
Batal16n de Infanter!a and five cadets 2 3 provided cover 
for the laborers, the latter holding up under tremendous 
return fire from the British lines. The blacks by the 
river caught some British sailors and beheaded two of them, 
though four managed to escape into the fort. 
On the morning of the 26th, Galvez sent a soldier with 
letters to Bene Huelhe, offering terms for surrrendering. 
Huelhe refused to accept them, but wrote that he would 
consider a prisoner exchange. Later in the day a 
brigantine anchored and fired artillery at the Spanish 
forces. The latter put up a great show, playing band music 
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Viceroy of New Spain, who sent Roberto Rivas with an army 
from Yucatan. The latter arrived too late for any action 
other than to capture the shipload of prisoner~ Bene Huelhe 
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Pedro Sula. After camping at Choloma, they arrived the 
132 
next day at Rancho Ojo de Agua, two leagues from San 
Fernando de Omoa. On the 25th, he took the heights around 
the fort and the river, to prevent the British from 
restocking or retreating. A report of the Spanish army 
states they had 230 rifles, 2 quintals of powder, and 3 
quintales of bullets, to be spread among the following 
troopsz 
Bata116n de Infanteria 
Squadron of Dragoons 
militias 
prisoners or "exiles" 
blacks, slaves 
totals 
troops 
50 
91 
296 
80 
60 
~
577 
officers 
4 
8 
22 
34 22 
A group of blacks went to def end the river and 
beachfront. The prisoners dug trenches to within 100 paces 
of the British front lines. Twelve grenadiers of the 
Batall6n de Infanter1a and five cadeta23 provided cover 
for the laborers, the latter holding up under tremendous 
return fire from the British lines. The blacks by the 
river caught some British sailors and beheaded two of them, 
though four managed to escape into the fort. 
On the morning of the 26th, Galvez sent a soldier with 
letters to Bene Huelhe, offering terms for surrrendering. 
Huelhe refused to accept them, but wrote that he would 
consider a prisoner exchange. Later in the day a 
brigantine anchored, and fired artillery at the Spanish 
forces. The latter put up a great show, playing band music 
133 
in several places and lighting many bonfires, in an effort 
to fool the British into thinking they had more forces than 
they did. The following morning Galvez sent a prisoner to 
request surrender again. He offered to punish the slaves 
who had killed the two British men by the river. Huelhe 
exchanged the prisoner for one of his, sending back another 
refusal. 24 
On the 28th, the British forces fired all they had at 
the Spanish in the trenches, the river mouth, and the 
cattle yards. Six blacks attempted a sortie to obtain 
food, but had to leave the two cows they killed outside. 
Boats came and went by the fort all day: by nightfall 
Ga l v e z be c am e s u s pi c i o u s , and o rd e r e d a pat r o 1 t o spy o u t 
the fort. A company of grenadiers had already gotten wind 
of what the British were up to, and stormed the gates. 
They moved too late--Huelhe and his men had already sailed 
away. According to Jose Rodriguez, they had set fire to 
the stores, spiked the cannon, and stolen all the weapons 
and ammunition in the fort. 25 
But there are several versions of the actual battle. 
Ca s ta n e d a s t a t e s t hat Ga l v e z w r o t e t o Bene Hu e l he t o 
surrender, then forced him out after the latter's 
refusai. 26 Rubio Sanchez has Galvez' version: after 
unsuccessfully negotiating with the British--at their 
request, wri tea Mencos Franco--he surprised and drove the 
enemy to their ships on the 30th of November. 27 Bancroft 
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sa7s the British took several leading men from the village 
with them as hostages. 28 The following morning, the 30th 
0£ November, Galvez had his men £ix the spiked cannon and 
take inventor1 or the fort artiller7. They still had 
£ort7-three cannon, including mortars and cul verins: ten 
on the exterior, six on the carenero, five on the land side 
bulwarks, seven on the seaside curtains, and fifteen Dn 
various other locations. 2 9 No mention is made or the 
British sacking the fort or damaging anything other than 
the spiked cannon and wounded pride or the Spanish. 
Rubio &inchez writes of several references recognizing 
bravery during the episode: Felipe de Gallegos, on 
September 22, 1780, £or leading the troops digging trenches 
while under £ire; Francisco Aybar, on September 26, a 
sergeant major from Comayagua, who held 0££ the British, 
not allowing them to retreat or use the Omoa river to 
restock their provisions; Antonio Esguardi, infantry, on 
the 24th of November, 1781, £or valor in battle.30 The 
Audiencia gave promotions to: Fernando de Porras, to 
Colonel; Captain Felix Dom!nguez, to Lieutenant-Colonel; 
Fran c i s c o Tr o n c o s o , Lui a Mend e z de S o t o m a yo r , M i g u e 1 
Hermosilla, and Ventura Galvan, to Captain. 
News of Galvez 1 recapture of Omoa soon reached the 
capital. On the seventh of December a proclamation was 
issued, declaring that: 
a. ma.as be said and a Te Deum sung in thanks for 
the happy restoration of the port of Omoa, 
executed the 28th of November, 1779, leaving as 
fugitives t~e garrison from England at seven 
that night.3 
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For his efforts, the Audiencia promoted Brigadier 
Matias de Galvez to Field Marshall. Desnaux, on the other 
hand, stood trial for having surrendered the fort. His 
defense showed who really was at fault: there had been 
almost no powder or ammunition when he took charge. He had 
accepted the position on the promises of Galvez to support 
and supp 1 y w ha t e v er h e n e e d e d • Th e a e pr o m i s e s Ga 1 v e z d id 
not keep; a request for powder and shot made August 18 was 
ignored, as were several subsequent orders. Had they been 
filled, Desnaux probably could have repulsed the British. 
Moreover, unknowingly of course, he had only been allowed 
one month in which to prepare for the attack. 
I went to the Fort of Omoa to take charge of 
its command persuaded of the effectiveness of 
the order issued to the squadron of Dragoons of 
Guatemala and two companies of militias from 
Comayagua to reinforce tthe fort). In addition 
to these guarantees I would have the powder 
necessary to defend myself, all offered me by 
the president; but the 2d expedition of the 
British arrived first.3 2 
Desnaux wrote to Drez Navarro that 
Little would it have served me to deny total 
capitulaton and remain obstinate in the 
defense, because this cannot be obtained while 
the fort is not finished, not properly manned, 
without powder or arms •••• It was not 
possible for Omoa. to be defended without aid, 
nor do I consider it possible that the G~neral 
[GalvezJ could have sent what we needed.3j 
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Desnaux made several suggestions for improvements. 
The assault proved that without the exterior earthworks (or 
at least completed works) the fort could not defend 
itself1 English soldiers had even taken cover in the old 
arms plaza or San Francisco. All tall buildings, trees, or 
structures should be removed from within the fort's cannon 
range. Other weaknesses included the unfinished 
counterscape, the unfinished gun emplacements, bulwark 
landfills, etc. The town should be moved to the top of the 
hill, if only for health reasons: the swamps and mangroves 
still had not been controlled.34 
Ga 1 v e z , i mp r e s s e d w it h De e n au z ' de re n s e , a pp a r en t 1 y 
also agreed with many or suggestions. But he spent more 
energy on an aggressive pursuit of the British, arguing 
that until the British had been eradicated from the 
Caribbean islands, the north coast of Honduras could not be 
safe, even if a coastguard force worked there. 
Everything verifies more the necessity in which 
are found these stopping points of Honduras, for 
throwing out the English from the island of 
Jamaica, to free them from their piracies, and 
of the unmeasured hel~ they give to the indian 
barbarians against us. 5 
' 
Galvez' rhetoric supported an offensive posture for 
Omoa, but he apparently meant an infantry challenge to the 
British forces, not a naval force. He, along with all the 
other governmental leaders in Guatemala, could not decide 
the purpose £or which the fort at Omoa had been built. 
Chapter Elevens The Fiasco 
Britain 1 e attacks on Omoa during the war in 1779 
appear in reality to have been merely a diversion to draw 
Spain's attention away from a major thrust toward Lake 
Nicaragua. 1 . Unfortunately for the British, these 
diversions actually ended up in a victory for Spain, and 
Nicaragua did not even suffer a small raid. 2 After the 
war, Spain requested negotiations for the return of 
Gibraltar: the. Spanish minister in London talked with an 
Irish ecclesiastic, Mr. Hussey, and later with a Mr. 
Cumberland. In return for Gibraltar, Spain promised to 
cede San Fernando de Omoa, Puerto Rico, lands in Oran, and 
to abrogate the treaty with France. Spain would also ally 
herself with England against the American insurgents, 
confirm the Treaty . of Paris of 1763, and to pay heavy 
indemnities for any destroyed English property.3 England 
declined the offer. 
In actuality, neither Omoa nor Trujillo had been very 
effective in ending the smuggling or the piracy among the 
Spanish and British seamen. Part of the reason why the 
forts did not stop aliens or corsairs from making off with 
the riches of the Spanish Crown appears to have been the 
same Spaniards who supposedly defended these riches. They 
often helped to pillage the Royal Treasury--as in the 
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Commander Palma case, for instance. But when it came to an 
actual invasion or the colonies, the projects to take by 
force these lands from Spain generally failed.Ji San 
Fernando de Omoa fell not through the fault of the Spanish 
military, or that or the fort itself solely, but rather 
because of the system that built it. Spa.in had 
overextended both in resources and organization, and its 
enemies proved too strong for her to hold an area so 
underdeveloped and sparsely inhabited. But its sheer size 
seemed to help the Spanish Empire: that may be one of the 
reasons why the fort at Omoa was not permanently lost to 
the British. Galvez saved the fort's honor at arms by 
recovering it. But it was then left, practically 
abandoned, without the improvements its builders and 
inspectors recommended. In a way, Omoa reflected the rest 
or the many American fortifications, weak only by belonging 
to the most dilapidated system of defense ever erected. 
That system had been built by an empire exhausted, drained 
by its own effort to expand, but it still withstood 
constantly the moat hardened attacks by Spain's enemies 
throughout the Caribbean.5 As Vel~zquez states in her 
analysis or the significance and effectiveness of the 
Spanish colonial defense system, through reviewing the 
history of this system there can be no doubt about the 
sharp insight of the Spaniards or the sixteenth century as 
they sought strategic places on the coasts of America.6 
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the treaty with France. 
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American insurgents, confirm the 
treaty of Paris, and pay heavy indemnities for any 
destroyed English property.3 England declined the offer. 
In actuality, neither Omoa nor Trujillo had been very 
effective in ending the smuggling or the piracy among the 
Spanish and British seamen. Pa.rt of the reason why the 
forts did not stop aliens or corsairs from making off with 
the riches of the Spanish Crown appears to have been the 
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of the colonies~ the projects to take by force these lands 
from Spain generally failed.4 San Fernando de Omoa fell 
not through the fault of the Spanish military, or that of 
the fort itself solely, but rather because of the system 
that built it. Spain had overextended both in resources 
and organization, and its enemies proved too strong for her 
to hold an area so underdeveloped and sparsely inhabited. 
But its sheer size seemed to help the Spanish Empire: that 
may be one of the reasons why the fort at Omoa was not 
p er m an en t 1 y 1 o a t t o t h e Br i t i s h. Ga 1 v e z a av e d t h e f or t 's 
honor at arms by recovering it. But it was then left, 
practically abandoned, without the improvements its 
builders and inspectors recommended. In a way, Omo a 
reflected the rest of the many American fortifications, 
weak only by belonging to the most dilapidated system of 
defense ever erected. That system had been built by an 
empire exhausted, drained by its own effort to expand, but 
it still withstood constantly the most hardened attacks by 
Spain's enemies throughout the Caribbean.5 As Velazquez 
states in her analysis of the significance and 
effectiveness of the Spanish colonial defense system, 
through reviewing the history of this system there can be 
no doubt about the sharp insight of the Spaniards of the 
sixteenth century as they sought strategic places on the 
coasts of America.6 
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Why did the Omoa project not become one of the 
outstanding examples of this excellent defense system? It 
had everything going for it--a good bay, ease of defense, a 
location close to all the Central American trouble spots. 
The trouble stemmed from the lack or military organization 
at the higher levels of government. No consistent line of 
authority appears to have been set down for the planning 
and execution of the blueprints for San Fernando de Omoa. 
Anyone in the Audiencia or the Council of the Indies could 
and did alter anything they wanted to. The original 
concept called for an offensive garrison to outfit royal 
corsairs and fleets to combat pirates and enemy naval 
forces. The Viceroy Duke of the Palata first came up with 
the idea, which apparently Aranda and D!ez used throughout 
the entire planning and construction stages. Bancroft 
quotes the royal c~dula of August 30, 1740, ordering the 
fortification of Omoa "as a further protection for the 
coasts of Honduras, and to serve as a calling-place for the 
coast guards for these parts," to show its planned 
benefits.7 
Right from the start Luis Drez Navarro had stated his 
theory behind the planning of the fort: 
It seems more to our purpose to build a fort in 
this port and not at Trujillo for several 
reasons, one of which is that two galeotas or 
pirogues could be based there as corsairs to 
capture as many ships as the English send to 
Valis Belize to load dyewood. The latter 
still persist in dealing in the above mentioned 
port or Trujillo, and the Spanish corsairs 
could continue to interrupt these incur'Sionsa 
all this is the reason for this proposal. 
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During the construction, however, the mentality or the 
administration in Guatemala changed enough to undermine the 
purpose tor the use or the tort. Active aggression no 
longer held sways passive defense became or paramount 
importance. The equipment and personnel sent to Omoa 
reflected this. No fleet received orders to operate from 
Omoa; only merchant ships used the port, except for an 
occasional military vessel docking for supplies. 
This drastic change in the intent of the fort brought 
about its demise. In 1779 the Spaniards had to use a half-
completed offensive fort in a defensive posture with rather 
predictable results. Had either concept been used 
consistently, it would have worked, as both had advantages. 
But either had to be implemented fully, within the limits 
of Spain's economic conditions. Spain built the wrong fort 
for the wrong reason. It needed not to defend the area 
from invaders, but rather to police against illegal trade 
with its own colonists. A police force meant going out and 
stopping the smugglers, not scaring them off with a show of 
strength. Accusations like Antonio Porta's that Omoa could 
not stop smuggling even in the nearby areas or Chamelec6n 
and Ulua rivers were true, if only because the fort had 
been built in Omoa.. Had it been assigned a fleet or ships 
to patrol the coasts, Omoa could have stopped, or at least 
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checked, the rampant smuggling. But the fleet was never 
assigned, so the smuggling continued. 
Perhaps the cost factor had something to do with its 
the fort took so long to build because or the many things 
going against it--unsanitary conditions, low priority, lack 
or adequate personnel--that the officials in Spain tired of 
throwing money at it. Because for so long commerce had 
been prohibited through Honduras, the colonists had 
established illegal lines of trade, making it impossible 
for the local government to collect enough taxes to pay for 
the project. Officials in Spain did not see much need for 
an expensive fort in a low-profit area, as can be seen in 
Arriaga's letter to Salazar, which showed that the Council 
wanted to finish the fort only to avoid admitting having 
wasted its money.9 
The longer it took to build the fort, the longer it 
would take to establish commerce enough to pay for the 
fort. But Spain could not afford that much time or money 
in one lump sum. Neither could it afford to operate an 
offensive or a large enough defensive fort in the Central 
American provinces in the mid-1700's. So the plans had 
been altered, paving the way for a major flaw in the 
defensive system of the colonies. By building the fort, 
Spain attracted the attention of the British military, like 
an invitation to attack. The fort had not been built for 
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that kind of attackf it needed a squadron of ships to 
complete its defenses. For this reason San Fernando de 
Omoa fell so easily to Dalrymple and Suttrell in 17791 the 
resistance put up by the Spaniards from a poorly equipped 
and unfinished fort could not meet an enemy force of equal 
strength, for no ships defended the bay in concert with the 
fort. io 
So the vast amount of lives and money spent on the 
construction of Omoa came to naught. Without counting the 
slight possibility of some deterrence earlier on in the 
project, Omoa became a fiasco, a monument to Spain's 
cumbersome government and lack of an effective, consistent 
defense policy. 
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